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CHARACTERIZATION, IDENTIFICATION OF
THE PROBLEM AREA, AND THE
POLICY-CENTERED CONFLICT
OF LAWS: AN EXERCISE IN
JUDICIAL METHOD
Robert Allen Sedler*
I. INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL METHOD AND THE POLICY-
CENTERED CONFLICT OF LAWS
It has now become standard practice to analyze problems of the
conflict of laws in terms of the distinction between the "traditional"
and "modern" approaches to the choice of law process.' The traditional
approach, of course, is the system of jurisdiction-selecting rules, based
on the vested rights theory of the conflict of laws and embodied in the
First Restatement. Although that approach continues to find favor
with a number of courts,2 it is said to be "generally discredited" among
academic commentators.3 The great debate today in the academic
world is over which of the "modern" approaches should be followed.
This, in turn, breaks down to a debate between the advocates of a
"modern rules approach," as set forth in the Restatement Second,4
and the advocates of a variety of what may be called "policy-centered
approaches," and still further, between the policy-centered advocates
themselves, concerning the merits of their respective solutions. The
academic debate has carried over into judicial decisions rendered by
those courts that are searching for a "modem approach." 5
0 A.B., J.D., University of Pittsburgh; Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 See the organization of the most recent casebook in the field, R. CRAMTON & D.
CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (1968).
2 See the justification set forth in Friday v. Smoot, - Del. , -, 211 A.2d 594,
596-97 (1965); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
3 See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (1963), referring to the
vested rights theory. He observes that Walter Wheeler Cook discredited it "as thoroughly
as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another."
4 See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROa.
679 (1963), setting forth the rationale for the Restatement Second., Professor Ehrenzweig
has vigorously contended that a Restatement is inappropriate for conflict of laws. See,
e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230 (1965).
5 See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12,
237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968) and Condin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.
2d 579 (1968).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
It is my submission, which has been developed more fully else-
where,6 that too much emphasis has been placed upon particular
academic approaches, and that insufficient attention has been given to
the operation of the judicial process in conflicts cases and the role of
the courts in establishing a body of conflicts law through judicial
decision. I have contended that the courts have been remiss in failing
to apply the principles of judicial method to the solution of conflicts
problems and in failing to accept the responsibility for developing
the "law" of the conflict of laws. Instead they have accepted an "ex-
ternally imposed" system of solution to conflicts problems and, for the
most part, have tried to decide cases within the framework of that
system.7 I have discussed what I think to have been the cause of this
phenomenon elsewhere,8 and will not repeat it here. Suffice it to say
that the present "law" of the conflict of laws has not been the result
of judicial decisions in particular cases and the development of prece-
dents and principles for future application. Judicial method has not
been applied to the conflict of laws.
In terms of approach, I advocate what I call judicial method and
the policy-centered conflict of laws. To explain precisely what I mean
by this approach let me back up a bit in order to distinguish not
between "traditional" and "modern" approaches, but between a "rules
approach" and my conception of the policy-centered conflict of laws.
The traditional approach consisted of a "few simple rules,"9 with the
function of the court being to locate the correct rule and to apply it
"objectively" to all cases coming within its scope. For example, if the
case were one of "tort," the rule was that the law of the "place of the
wrong," defined as the state where the last event necessary to make the
actor liable occurred, governed all matters of "substance.' 10 The court
was not to consider the fact-law pattern of the particular case, the
content of the differing laws, the social and economic policies of the
concerned states and their "interest" in having their laws applied,
but was merely to locate the "correct rule" and apply it.
6 Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27 (1967).
7 The system, however, contains enough manipulative techniques within it to enable
a court willing to employ them to achieve the substantive result that it wants. See the
discussion in Hancock, Three Approaches to the Choice of Law Problem, in XXrH CEN-
TURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 365, 366 (K. Nadelman, A. Von Mehren & J.
Hazard eds. 1961) [hereinafter cited as XXTH CENTURY] and Sedler, supra note 6, at 48-53.
8 Sedler, supra note 6, at 53-57.
9 Reese, supra note 4, at 680.
10 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 378 (1934).
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It is this approach that is now "discredited" in the academic
world. New restaters have substantially completed a Restatement
Second, and they do not hesitate to enumerate the deficiencies of the
predecessor work and its underlying theory." But in terms of method-
ology and the function of the court in developing norms of conflicts
of law, the "modern approach" of the Restatement Second differs hardly
at all. As with the First Restatement, it represents an externally estab-
lished system of rules applicable to the solution of all conflicts prob-
lems. The rules have been changed,'2 and some limited consideration
may be given to the policies behind the differing substantive laws,13
but it is still the function of the court in a conflicts case to locate the
"correct rule" and to apply it "objectively."' 4 The distinction between
the Restatement First and the Restatement Second, then, is but a
distinction between different rules and at most a distinction between
different kinds of "rules approaches."
The policy-centered conflict of laws, however, rejects a system
of rules as the solution to conflicts problems. Instead it looks to the
fact-law pattern of a particular case and asks whether, in light of the
relevant social and economic policies of the concerned states and
considerations of fairness to the parties, the law of the forum should
be displaced and the law of another state employed as a model for
the rule of decision in that case. 15 It has its genesis in the attacks
mounted on the vested rights theory and the First Restatement by
Lorenzen, 6 Yntema,'17 and most especially, Walter Wheeler Cook.18
11 Reese, supra note 4, at 679-80.
12 The major change is that they are no longer made to depend upon a single con-
tact point, but are often localizing rules, looking to the state of the most significant
relationship. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188
(Prop. Off. Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), Introductory Note to ch. 7.
13 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 6, at 61-63.
14 It is interesting to note that the drafters approach problems from the perspective
of the "disinterested third state." See Reese, supra note 4, at 692-93; cf. Currie, The Dis-
interested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754 (1963).
15 The concept of foreign law being brought over as a model for the rule of decision
in the particular case was a part of the local law theory of the nature of the conflict
of laws as developed by Walter Wheeler Cook. See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 469 (1924). It was also a part of Learned Hand's
"highly homologous right" theory. See, e.g., Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942
(2d Cir. 1934). See also Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822
(1950).
16 See, e.g., Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924).
17 See, e.g., Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J.
468 (1928).




While it does not contain a specific method of solution, it brings
within its scope the approaches of modern commentators such as
Ehrenzweig, 19 Currie,20 Cavers,21 Leflar, 22 and Weintraub, 23 all of
whom, while they disagree--often heatedly-on the specific approach
to be followed, place emphasis on considerations of policy and fairness
and on the necessity of case by case adjudication. This, in my opinion,
furnishes enough of a common ground to serve as a source for a
judicial approach to the solution of conflicts problems.
This approach envisions the courts themselves assuming the re-
sponsibility for the establishment of a body of conflicts law based
on precedents and principles developed in the decision of particular
cases. These decisions on what law would be applied, or more ac-
curately, whether the law of the forum should be displaced,2 4 would
be made with reference to the particular fact-law pattern before the
court and would be based upon a consideration of the policies behind
the differing laws, the interests of the concerned states in implementing
those policies and what result would be fair to the parties. The pre-
cedents and principles developed in those decisions would serve as
a guide to the solution of questions presented in future cases. In time
a body of conflicts decisional law would emerge in each jurisdiction.25
While the views of academic commentators concerning the proper
solution of conflicts problems should and could be considered by the
19 Although Professor Ehrenzweig's remarkable and prolific scholarship has resulted
in two treatises, A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws (1962) and PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1967), it is his numerous articles that develop his thesis most fully. See, e.g.,
Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CALIF. L. REV. 240
(1961) and A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Ap-
proach," 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965).
20 His thesis is set forth in the articles collected in B. CURIUE, SELECrED EsSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
21 Professor Cavers was one of the early critics of the traditional approach. See
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933). After a
number of years of reflection his views have been set forth in D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-
LAW PRocEss (1965).
22 See, e.g., the following articles by Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966); More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966); True "False Conflicts," 48 B.U.L. REV. 164 (1968).
23 See, e.g., the following articles by Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflicts
Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963); Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IOWA L.
REv. 399 (1968); The Impact of a Functional Analysis Upon the "Pervasive Problems"
of the Conflict of Laws, 15 U.C.LA.L. REV. 817 (1968).
24 We are proceeding on the assumption that the basic law is the law of the
forum, which will not be displaced absent valid reasons for such displacement. See note
37 infra and accompanying text.
25 It must be remembered that relatively few conflicts cases come before most state
courts, and that many of these cases involve the same fact-law pattern. But this is no dif-
ferent from the situation prevailing in other areas of law that are not extensively litigated.
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courts, as in any other case, the courts would not see themselves as
being "compelled" to adopt the approach favored by a particular
commentator.26 It would be the function of the courts to render deci-
sions on the displacement of the law of the forum, which would then
serve as the basis of a judicially-established conflict of laws.2 7 While
I shall refer to this in the remainder of the writing as the policy-
centered approach; it must be understood that judicial method is its
primary component, and the concentration will be on the role of the
courts in developing a body of conflicts law and on the processes by
which this is done.
The underlying rationale of this approach relates to the reasons
why the forum court displaces its law in any case. Why should the
forum ever put aside its own law with which it is intimately familiar
and that reflects its reasoned judgment (or that of its legislature)
on matters of policy, fairness and the like, and in its stead apply the
law of another state? Recognizing as we now do that the objective of
uniformity of decision irrespective of the forum in which suit is
brought28 is illusory and unobtainable,29 it may be asked whether,
in the nature of things, there is any objection to the forum's applying
its own law in all cases coming before it? What would happen if
the courts, as they originally did in England,30 would simply ignore
the foreign element and decide the case according to the substantive
law of the forum? Would this produce injustice or be violative of
the interests of other states in the legal order?31
26 In all fairness the policy-centered theorists have not contended that the courts
should accept their approach as the ultimate solution to all conflicts problems. There
is a significant difference between developing a theory that one hopes courts will follow-
as to some extent every commentator does when he writes-and setting forth an ultimate
solution, as I think the drafters of the first Restatement-and perhaps the drafters of
the Restatement Second-were trying to do. For a disclaimer of intent see B. CURIE,
supra note 20, at 585.
27 Professor Cavers proposed the development of a body of conflicts law based on
judicial decision, Cavers, supra note 21. In re-reading that article, I find that many of
the points I have made with respect to the judicial function were also made by Professor
Cavers in 1933. However, the experience of the thirty-odd years that have passed since
the publication of Professor Cavers' article now makes it possible to go beyond his
limited proposal of that time. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 6, at 87 n.270.
28 This is the justification that has been advanced for the "rules approach," both
traditional and modern. See H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 4-5 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964).
29 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 6, at 46-53.
30 For a discussion of the development of the conflict of laws in England see Sack,
Conflict of Laws in the History of English Law, 3 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935,
at 342 (1937), reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw ScHooLs, SELECTED READINGS ON
CONFLICTS OF LAws 1 (1956). See also A. DicEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (6th ed. J. Morris
1949).
31 The "state" is the relevant political entity for conflicts purposes. It may be defined
as a geographical portion of the earth's surface having an independent system of law,
[Vol. 2:8
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The answer, of course, is that it would in some cases. Even if the
concept of transient jurisdiction were eliminated and jurisdiction
were limited to a forum conveniens5 2 the application of the forum's
law in every case coming before it could not be justified.83 There will
be cases in which the application of the forum's law would be clearly
unfair in that it would defeat the legitimate expectations of the parties
or would be violative of the interests of other states that, in the cir-
cumstances, are entitled to recognition. 4
If this is the reason for the displacement for the law of the forum,
is it not sound to approach the choice of law problem with reference
to the underlying reason and to try to answer the question contained
therein: in the fact-law pattern presented in the particular case, should
the law of the forum be displaced in order to protect the legitimate
expectations of the parties or to give proper recognition to the inter-
ests of another state? The soundness of this approach is all the more
manifest since this kind of question, i.e. a question of choice of law,
is presented in relatively few cases coming before the court, i.e. cases
often involving identical or similar fact-law patterns.35 We have gone
about the business of finding solutions for conflicts problems in a com-
and includes, therefore, component parts of a federal system, such as an "American state."
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 3 and the comment thereto.
32 Ehrenzweig, Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
33 See the discussion in Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restate-
ment" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 350-52 (1965).
34 It must be remembered that among the policy-centered theorists, there is dis-
agreement on just what is meant by interest and how relevant interest should be in
the choice of law decision. See the discussion in D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 98-102. But
all would agree that interest-however defined-has some relevance.
35 My research into torts conflicts cases in Kentucky has revealed that every case
coming before the Kentucky Court of Appeals between 1950 and 1967-the last conflicts
case prior to 1950 was decided in 1940-involved the identical fact-law pattern, in which
two residents of Kentucky, which does not have a guest statute, were involved in an ac-
cident in a state which did. In 1968 a case came before the court involving two residents
from a guest statute (and spousal immunity) state who were injured in an accident in
Kentucky. Research into torts conflicts cases coming before the courts of the neigh-
boring state of Indiana has disclosed that the last one coming before the supreme
court was decided in 1946 and the last one coming before an intermediate appellate
court was decided in 1953. For a discussion of the paucity of Indiana cases see Watts
v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1965); Witherspoon v. Salm, - Ind. App.
-, 237 N.E.2d 116 (1968), rev'd on other grounds,- Ind. -, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969). In
Abendschein v. Farrell, 11 Mich. App. 662, 667, 162 N.W.2d 165, 167 (1968), the court
of appeals discovered that the last "torts conflicts" case decided by the Michigan Supreme
Court was decided in 1939, and considered itself bound by that case to apply the law
of the place of wrong, although it observed that the case was not based on any au-
thority which remains viable today. When the case reached the supreme court, how-
ever, the place of the wrong rule was retained. Abendschein v. Farrell, 582 Mich. 510, 170
N.W.2d 137 (1969).
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pletely dysfunctional way and in a way contrary to the common law
method of judicial decision that is employed in other cases. We have
adopted an externally imposed system of a priori rules (or a compre-
hensive approach) and have tried to fit the problem in the particular
case within the framework of those rules (or the methodology of the
approach). Instead, we should be looking to the kinds of conflicts prob-
lems that come before the courts for decision and should be making
the decisions with reference to those problems and those cases, thereby
developing precedents and principles to be applied to future problems
and future cases.
It is submitted, therefore, that the reason why a court displaces
its own law furnishes guidance on how it should go about the matter.
If it displaces its own law because it is necessary to do so in a parti-
cular case in view of considerations of fairness to the parties or recog-
nition of the interests of other states, the decision concerning such
displacement should be made on a case by case basis and should be
made with reference to those very considerations. Hence, the concept
of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws has de-
veloped.
The four propositions on which this concept is based have been
discussed at length elsewhere 36 and may be summarized as follows:
One: The basic law is the law of the forum, and that law will
not be displaced absent valid reasons for such displacement. The
significance of this proposition lies primarily in the matter of proof
of foreign law, and it directs the court to apply the forum's law in
all cases unless the party wishing to rely on foreign law proves the
content of such law and shows that it differs from the substantive law
of the forum.3 7
Two: There is only a conflict of laws when the result, were the
case to be heard in the courts of the state whose law is sought to be
used as a model, would be different from the result that would be
reached under the substantive law of the forum. This proposition is
in no way connected with the "renvoi," since the matter of renvoi
in the strict sense arises only when a court is committed to a "rules"
approach and the conflicts rules of the forum and another state differ.38
The contention is that if the basic law is that of the forum, there is
36 Sedler, supra note 6, at 87-107.
37 Compare the results in Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1956) with Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951). See also B. CuRIE, Supra
note 20, ch. 1.




generally no utility in "creating a choice of law issue," and this is
what the court would be doing when, if the case were to be brought
in the state the law of which is sought to be used as a model, the courts
of that state would decide the case in accordance with the substantive
law of the forum. There is substantial and distinguished authority in
disagreement with this viewpoint, 9 and it is not necessary to consider
this contention in the context of the present writing.
Three: The decision concerning the displacement of the forum's
law should be made only with reference to the fact-law pattern pre-
sented in the particular case. This proposition lies at the heart of
judicial method, and its adoption would mark a significant departure
from the behavior patterns of most courts in conflicts cases. Generally
the issue is framed in broad terms, such as "what law governs liability
for tort," which is contrary to the way the issue is framed in most
non-conflicts cases. My submission is that the issue should be framed
in light of the fact-law pattern there presented, identifying the relevant
factors and pointing out the conflict between the substantive laws of
the concerned states. In the Babcock v. Jackson40 situation, for example,
the issue should be stated as follows: "When two residents of New
York, which does not have a guest statute, are involved in an auto-
mobile accident in Ontario, which does have such a statute, should
the law of the forum be displaced and the law of the state of injury
applied to the question of guest-host liability?" The court's considera-
tion then would be limited to that precise issue. It would not be
necessary for the court to consider what law would govern liability
for the publication of a libel or the commission of a battery, or what
law would apply in a suit between a resident and a non-resident,
because those issues are not involved in that case. Nor is it necessary
that the court adopt a rule or principle that can automatically be
applied in those other cases. When-and if-they do arise, the matter
can be decided at that time, and in rendering its decision the court
can consider the precedential value of the present case. Some courts
are now framing issues in this manner and limiting their decision
to the issue presented in the particular case.41 This is in accordance
with the way issues are framed in non-conflicts cases and may betoken
a return to judicial method in conflicts cases as well.
89 See D. CAVE.S, supra note 21, at 105-07; A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 336
(1962); cf. Von Mehren, The Renvoi and Its Relation to Various Approaches to the
Choice-of-Law Problem, in XXTH CENTURY 380, 389-94.
40 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
41 See, e.g., Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
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Four: The law of the forum should be displaced only when con-
siderations of fairness to the parties and proper recognition of the
interests of another state so require. This proposition does not furnish
any guide to the court's decision in a particular case and is not in-
tended to do so. The courts must, as Judge Roger Traynor has said,
"painstakingly evolve pragmatic exceptions to the local law. '42 What
this proposition does is merely to restate the justification for the
displacement of the forum's law and to direct the court to make its
decision realistically and with reference to considerations of fairness
and policy.
The important question is what role the courts will play in pro-
viding the norms for decisions in conflicts cases. A court that contin-
ues to apply the "traditional" rules approach of the First Restatement,
or one that uncritically applies the "modern" rules approach of the
Restatement Second is abdicating judicial responsibility for the estab-
lishment of those norms. I believe that more and more courts are
moving in the direction of the policy-centered approach, which under
my definition includes the use of judicial method, to resolve conflicts
issues. These courts are developing a body of conflicts law based upon
considerations of policy and fairness and are doing so in the context
of decisions made with reference to the fact-law pattern of the par-
ticular case.43 They are carefully considering the views of academic
commentators and the solutions proposed by the Restatements, but at
the same time are making it clear that they are developing the law
through their own decisions rather than by accepting an "externally-
imposed solution of universal application." 44 They are applying judi-
cial method to the policy-centered conflict of laws.
No court, however, is ever operating with an entirely clean slate,
nor should it ignore what has gone before. Cases have been decided
previously, principles and rules have been developed, ideas have
been expounded-in short, for better or worse, there has been exper-
42 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. REv. 657, 667 (1959). It
is accurate to say that Professor Ehrenzweig's "true rule" approach is also based on the
development of "exceptions to the local law." See the statement of Professor Ehrenzweig
in E. CHEATHAM, E. GluswoL-, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON CON-
FLIcT OF LAws 478-79 (1964).
43 I consider Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), to be the best
example.
44 For a personally painful example of the rejection of the views of an academic
commentator see Arnett v. Thompson, 443 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. 1968). I consider the
decision in that case to be a good illustration of how the court, while considering various
views, develops its judicial conclusion on how conflicts problems are best resolved.
[Vol. 2:8
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ience in the solution of conflicts problems. This experience must be
understood, if for no other reason, than to enable the court to avoid
the perpetuation of past mistakes. At a minimum, past decisions
must be considered in order to determine whether they are still
good law. More importantly, the court should ask whether the ex-
perience of the past-its ideas, its concepts, its methodology-may
still be significant or relevant to its present approach. Although the
court may be abandoning the traditional approach as a method of
solution to conflicts problems, perhaps some of its elements may be
carried over or transformed and thereby achieve new utility.45
It is the purpose of this writing to analyze the essential basis of
the traditional approach, classification, or as it was more generally
called, characterization, and to consider that process as it relates to
judicial decision under the policy-centered approach. It is my thesis
that while the process of characterization itself is inconsistent with the
policy-centered approach, the concept46 of characterization can be trans-
formed into the concept of identification of the problem area, which
has great utility in assisting a court to arrive at sound decisions based
upon considerations of policy fairness. The concept of identification of
the problem area introduces a new element into conflicts methodology,
which has not been associated with "policy-based" solutions.47 It will be
my objective (and perhaps my burden) to demonstrate the utility of this
new element. Since it is based upon the traditional process of char-
acterization, it may be that the experience of the courts with that
process in the past may have present-day relevance. In any event, it
is necessary to consider the operation of characterization under the
traditional approach in order to show the relationship of that concept
to the concept of identification of the problem area. Before doing so,
however, characterization as an aid to problem-solving generally and in
the non-legal context, as well as the place of characterization in the legal
system apart from its use in the traditional approach to the conflict
of laws shall be considered.
45 But see Weintraub, The Impact of a Functional Analysis upon the "Pervasive
Problems" of the Conflict of Laws, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 817 (1968), in which the author
contends that the utility of the functional approach is demonstrated precisely because it
eliminates problems resulting from the use of traditional methodology.
46 For a discussion of the meaning of the "concept," see notes 57-65 infra and
accompanying text.
47 Classification has been considered inconsistent with functional and result-selective
approaches. See Hancock, Three Approaches to the Choice of Law Problem: The Classi-
ficatory, The Functional and the Result-Selective, in XXTn CENTURY 365. See also Wein-
traub, supra note 45, at 818-20.
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II. CHARACTERIZATION AND PROBLEM-SOLVING: ABSTRACTION,
CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES
A question of the conflict of laws, as any question presented to a
court for decision, requires an exercise of judgment on the part of
the person making that decision, that is, on the part of the judge.
In considering how courts, or more realistically judges, make judg-
ments, we can begin by asking how any person makes a judgment.
The important question is what does he judge, and the answer is
that he judges the characteristics of the object of the judgment.48 The
particular characteristics that he will judge depend on the question
that has been asked of him. He may be asked to judge some specified
attribute such as size; e.g., is one fish larger than the other. This is a
one-dimensional judgment, since only one characteristic of the object
of the judgment, the size of the fish, is being judged. He is judging
the perceptual characteristics of the object, that is, what he perceives
directly through the use of his senses. This is an "easy" judgment,
because there has been good preparation of the subject-he is asked
to judge one aspect of the object, which he can directly perceive-
and good control of the stimulus variables-the two fish can be placed
side by side or one on top of the other. Moreover, both fish can be
measured in standard physical units, and both fish can be presented
repeatedly to the judge. A sensory judgment, in which the judge is
judging only the perceptual characteristics of the object, is obviously
a fairly easy kind to make.
A second class of judgments is when the subject judges the affec-
tive characteristics of the object. This kind of judgment is based on
the judge's likes and dislikes and on his reaction to the object; e.g.,
"I don't like artichokes," "she is beautiful." It is said that affective
judgments are "the most primitive, effortless form of reaction to the
environment. ' '49 This class of judgments is completely subjective be-
cause it depends on the response of the particular judge to the object
of the judgment.
The most difficult kind of judgment is a judgment of the abstract
or conceptual characteristics of the object because such a judgment
requires that the object be considered in relation to something else
48 D. JOHNSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT AND JUDGMENT 287 (1955). Most of
the material that follows is taken from this basic text. It is the belief of the present
writer that when one is a layman in a field, he should limit his consideration to works
of that sort and should not attempt to become involved in the refinements of viewpoint
among experts in that field.
49 Id. at 288.
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and without regard to its perceptual or affective characteristics. The
classic example of an abstract judgment is the cataloguing of a new
book in a library. The judgment of the cataloguer is directed only
toward the abstract characteristics of the book and the relation of
those characteristics to an equally abstract classification system. In
terms of the judgment the cataloguer must make, it does not matter
whether the book is large or small or whether or not he "likes" it.
In order to make the judgment called for, the cataloguer must have
knowledge of the thing in relation to which the object is being judged;
i.e. the classification system, as well as knowledge and understanding
of the object's abstract characteristics. He must relate the abstract
characteristics of the book to the basis of his abstract classification
system. The mental or intellectual operations directed toward ab-
stract judgments are more difficult simply because the thinker has
more to do.50 It is abstract judgments, of course, that a court must
make whenever dealing with a legal problem.
The essence of making abstract judgments relates to words. We
must develop words that describe the abstract characteristics of the
object and that can be used to relate the object to something else.
An abstract judgment is expressed in words of a qualitatively different
kind from those used to express perceptual or affective judgments.
When viewed from the verbal perspective, the process of abstraction
becomes a matter of leaving characteristics out, of relating the object
being described to other objects that have some of the same character-
istics, but that have other characteristics as well.51 By emphasizing
the same characteristics and leaving out the ones that are different,
we develop a general term to describe a class of objects, and it is this
general term that makes communication and thought about that class
of objects possible. 52 Suppose that in a village there are four "struc-
tures" called Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta. In each structure there
50 As the author observes:
Abstracting a trait such as sociability from a jumble of past and present im-
pressions that occurred in heterogeneous contexts, and differentiating this trait
from cheerfulness, talkativeness, intelligence, and aggressiveness, is more in-
volved, requires more thought control, than isolating length from width and
coloi, or feeling tone from objective dimensions. There are more possibilities
for interference because things are similar and dissimilar in respect to so many
abstract properties, one of which may be about as prominent as another. It
seems likely, therefore, that most people have to work harder at abstract judg-
ments, with less rewarding consequences, other things being equal. The set that
controls thought is organized with more effort, and more effort is required for
maintenance and resistance to interference.
Id. at 289.
51 S. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND AcTION 167-68 (1949).
52 Id. at 168-70.
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are people "living," that is, they sleep there, take most meals there,
keep their possessions there and the like. Each structure is different
in the sense, if no other, that each is comprised of different atoms and
molecules, but it is likely that there will be perceptual differences
as well; e.g., Alpha structure has a crack in the window. As long as
these are the only four structures in the village used for "living"
the words Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta are sufficient for communi-
cation. But if there is a question of building a new structure for
"living," such as when another family moves into the village, a new
word is necessary, since each of the existing words has too specific
a meaning, referring to a structure located at a particular place and
occupied by particular persons. It is necessary to develop a word at
a higher level of abstraction that means something which has certain
characteristics in common with Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta, but
yet is not limited to the particular structure to which each of those
words refers. By ignoring perceptual differences such as size, color and
so on, and by concentrating on common characteristics such as the fact
that all of the structures are used for habitation by particular persons,
we can come up with the word "house," which describes Alpha, Beta,
Gamma and Delta, but which also describes any other structures used
for habitation by particular persons. Having such a word, we are not
only able to communicate about houses, but to think about houses
unlimited by specific structures called Alpha, Beta, Gamma and
Delta. 53
There are a number of verbal levels of abstraction. At each level
more and more characteristics are omitted, but a relation is found be-
tween the different objects described by the general term, because all
share certain characteristics. Hayakawa's "Abstraction Ladder 5 4 uses
the example of Bessie the cow. When we say that Bessie is a "cow," we
are selecting the similarities between Bessie and other animals of like
size, functions and habits, but ignoring the differences that enable us
on a lower level of abstraction to call a particular cow "Bessie." 55 The
more characteristics of Bessie we leave out, the higher the level of
abstraction that we can employ. If we classify Bessie as "livestock," we
are referring only to those characteristics that she has in common with
pigs, chickens and the like, thereby leaving out more about the "real"
Bessie than when we refer to her as a "cow." So long as we are willing
53 Id.
54 Id. at 169.
55 In the abstraction ladder "Bessie" is at the third level. Below that is the cow we
perceive and the cow known to science. Id.
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to leave out characteristics, we can abstract at higher and higher
levels. Bessie, therefore, can also be classified as "farm assets," or "as-
set" or "wealth," where our frame of reference is Bessie's economic
utility. If our frame of reference is Bessie's place in the animal king-
dom, we could refer to her as "mammal," vertebrate," and so on. It
should be clear by now that the process of abstracting, of leaving char-
acteristics out, is an "indispensable convenience" to thought and judg-
ment.
56
It is through the process of abstraction-and it is here that the
verbal aspect is most significant-that we develop concepts.57 Psychol-
ogists relate concepts to ideas and differentiation. A concept refers to
the general idea,58 and a person acquires the concept of something
when he can either define it, or what is more likely, differentiate it
from something else. A child has developed the concept of "dog"
when he can distinguish a dog from a variety of objects that are not
"dogs," even though he cannot verbalize a definition of "dog."59 In
developing that concept he has necessarily gone through the process of
abstracting the common characteristics of certain specific animals, and
whenever he sees one of those animals, he thinks of it as a "dog." He
relates the black dog to the white dog rather than to the black cat, be-
cause the characteristics giving rise to the concept of "dog" in his
mind-of which color is not one-are common both to the black dog
and the white dog, but not to the cat. He can think about "dogs," be-
cause he has developed the concept of "dog" in that he can differenti-
ate dogs from other animals that do not possess the characteristics of
"dogs."
The obvious utility of concepts is that they divide things up. They
organize the world of unaccountable objects, events and ideas into a
relatively small number of categories.60 New things are put into
familiar categories, and the effect of previous learning is transferred
to them.61 It is only through concepts that the human organism may
operate in the world of thought, and it is "man's will to conceive
which impresses order on a confused intellectual environment." 62 It
56 Id. at 168-70.
57 See the discussion in S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEw KEY 71-72 (3d ed. 1967).
58 D. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 133.
,9 Id.
60 Id. at 133-34.
61 Id. at 134.
62 Id. at 234. The "will to conceive" must be distinguished from the "will to per.
ceive." As the author observes: "Just as a man, with powerful perceptual apparatus, may
be endowed with a 'will to perceive,' so may he, since he possesses an extraordinary capac-
ity for abstraction, be endowed with a will to conceive." Id. at 233-34.
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is said, therefore, that "if there were no natural tendency to divide up
the world into concepts, the human organism would soon invent one,
because the labor-saving value of a system of concepts is enormous,
and any moderately useful system will be continuously reinforced." 63
The discussion of concepts should be readily understandable to
the lawyer, who is continually abstracting and putting new things
into familiar categories. All rules of law are based on abstraction,
and these rules are combined into "general groupings or categories
that reflect factual and functional similarities and doctrinal conti-
nuities. '64 As has been observed:
For the legal order as for human activity generally, appropriate
use of abstraction economizes on time and energy. Through con-
cepts and generalizations the human mind frees itself for creative
thought and analysis, and experience is rendered transmissible.
Thus, in law as in other human affairs, abstraction and system
ensure a certain stability, economy, coherency and continuity.65
Following the concept in the "hierarchy of thought" is the prin-
ciple. A principle is a concept in the sense that events can be classified
as falling or not falling within it. More importantly, a principle states
a relationship between concepts, and therefore, can be used to arrive
at new conclusions or deductions or to guide new activities.66 Prin-
ciples of law frequently serve this purpose. It is a principle of law
that "where there is a right, the law will supply a remedy" (ubi ius, ibi
remedium). "Right" and "remedy" are both concepts, representing
the differences between "interests entitled to legal protection" and
"the method by which such protection is afforded." The principle,
"where there is a right, the law will supply a remedy," states a rela-
tionship between those concepts and enables us to proceed a step
further in our thinking about them.
While concepts and principles by themselves do not solve prob-
lems, they can provide the tools for the solution of many problems.6 7
Suppose that B insults A, and that A then sues B to recover damages
for the insult. The court must first ask whether there is a "right" to
be free from insults at the hands of another. It considers the other kind
of interests it has recognized as constituting a "right" and decides
whether the interest in question has enough of the same characteristics
so that it should be included in the concept. If it decides that there
63 Id. at 234.
64 A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 437 (1965).
65 Id.
66 D. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 237.
67 Id. at 238.
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is a "right" here, it can apply the principle of "where there is a right,
the law will supply a remedy," and may conclude that damages is an
appropriate remedy by which the right can be protected.
As pointed out previously, concepts divide things up into cate-
gories. Through the process of classification we put new facts, new
situations and so forth into established categories. These categories
are likely to be organized in a hierarchy of levels of abstraction, the
best example of which would be a taxonomic system.68 The system is
"given," and the new data is "up for judgment" in order that it can
be fitted into the system. So when a zoologist classifies a new specimen,
for example, "he matches the pattern facing him with the pattern of
his taxonomic system to see where, in his judgment, it fits." 69 Each
category in our "thought system" is expressed by a word, which con-
notes what that category means to us. 70 It is on the basis of the connota-
tive meaning of our different categories that we decide whether par-
ticular data is to be placed in one category or another. Data-a fact,
object, event or the like-has no name and belongs to no category
until we put it into one, and the particular category into which we
put it will depend on the purpose of the classification. 71 The botanist
will classify a tomato as a "fruit," because a tomato has the charac-
teristics that he ascribes to the word "fruit" in the classification system
that he uses, a system that he has established to meet the purposes of
botanical classification. In view of those purposes, the botanist has
concluded that he is more concerned about the similarities between
tomatoes and let us say, apples, than he is about the differences. But
the supermarket proprietor who has established categories of "fruits"
and "vegetables" excludes tomatoes from his category of "fruit," be-
cause the connotative meaning of the word "fruit" to himself and his
customers excludes the characteristics of a tomato. This demonstrates
very clearly the proposition that the meaning of a word can only be
described with reference to the context in which it is being used.72
To the botanist "tomato" means "fruit," while to the supermarket
proprietor it means "vegetable." Both meanings are "correct" when
the context in which the word is being used and the different purposes
of the classification systems of the botanist and the supermarket pro-
prietor are considered. As we explore the process of classification of
68 Id. at 134.
69 Id. at 312.
70 See generally S. HAYAKAWA, supra note 51, at 58-59 (discussion of "connotation').
71 Id. at 209-11.
72 See the discussion of the "One Word, One Meaning Fallacy" and the "Ignoring
of Contexts," id. at 60-64.
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data into categories, we must be aware that there is no "natural" or
"fixed" classification, and that the category into which particular data
will be put cannot be separated from the purpose of the classification.
Classification occurs only in context.73
Whenever a judgment must be made about data, it is very im-
portant to consider the number of categories into which the data may
be put. The nature of the judgment we are called upon to make may
limit the number of categories. Suppose that a jury is told to return
a verdict of "guilty" or "innocent." The direction calls for a two-
category judgment, and the accused cannot be found to be "too
guilty" to be "guilty" or "too innocent" to be "innocent." 74 On the
other hand, a jury called upon to return a verdict in a homicide case
is usually asked to make a "judgment in several heterogeneous cate-
gories, '75 such as when it is directed to determine whether the accused
is guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty
of voluntary manslaughter, or innocent of all charges. To go a step
further, the classification system of the librarian or zoologist calls for
"judgment in several related categories,"'7 6 but here too, the number
of categories is limited notwithstanding that such judgments are multi-
dimensional in that the objects of the judgment are classified in sev-
eral dimensions at once. At the furthest end of the spectrum is an
undefined classification system with an unlimited number of categories
and the opportunity to create new ones. A moment's reflection will
indicate that the categories of the law belong to this kind of system.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to demonstrate
the function of the category in the judgmental process. A problem to
be solved represents data about which a judgment must be made.
Unless the problem17 is a simple one calling for a perceptual judgment
or involves a personal response so that an affective judgment will
suffice, we can solve the problem only by the use of concepts and prin-
ciples-the "stuff" of which an abstract judgment is made. Concepts
enable us to divide the totality of data into a number of categories,
and when we are confronted with new data, such as a problem, we
73 A good example of this point for legal purposes is the distinction between
substance and procedure, which is drawn in at least three situations, each of which
raises different policy considerations. See the discussion in Sedler, The Erie Outcome
Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 813,
817-20 (1962). See also W. CooK, supra note 18, at 163-65.
74 D. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 326.
75 Id. at 327.
76 Id. at 328.
77 As to the nature of a "problem," see id. at 63-64.
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attempt to classify that data into familiar categories, thereby transfer-
ring to it the effects of previous learning.
The legal term most frequently used to describe the classification
of data into categories is characterization, and we will now consider
how characterization operates in the legal system. But it is important
to remember that the process of classifying is in no way peculiar to
the solution of legal problems. Any problem calling for an abstract
judgment necessarily involves the use of classification and an under-
standing of concepts and principles.
III. CHARACTERIZATION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
What we call a "legal judgment"; i.e. the kind of judgment made
by lawyers and judicial officials, generally has as its object what may
best be described as a fact situation. We judge the characteristics
of a given set of facts to determine what legal consequences are to
be attached to it. In other words, a fact situation represents a "prob-
lem to be solved" by the exercise of a legal judgment.
The particular kind of judgment that we make about the fact
situation will depend upon the reason why that fact situation has been
presented to us for judgment. When a client consults a lawyer about
making a will, for example, the lawyer views the fact situation with
reference to the kind of will that, in light of those facts, he should
draw up for the client. The nature of the client's relationship with
his wife would be viewed in the context of the judgment about what
kind of will the client should have, given the nature of the relation-
ship. The nature of the relationship would be viewed differently if
a different judgment were called for, such as whether the client could
obtain a divorce.
Let us approach the matter from the standpoint of a judge look-
ing at the fact situation in a case coming before him for decision. The
ultimate question for decision is which party shall prevail, and on this
question the judge makes what is called a general judgment. However,
the general judgment will usually depend on the judgments that he
makes about specific questions that are raised by the fact situation, or
more accurately, by different parts of the situation. For example, some
of the facts indicate that the suit may have been filed after the ap-
plicable limitation period has expired.78 The judge will consider that
question first, and if he answers it in the affirmative, he has thereby
78 As a practical matter, the indicating facts are raised by the opposing party.
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answered the basic question and solved the problem: the defendant
prevails (basic question), because the plaintiff's claim is barred by
limitation (specific question). In any event, what the judge is doing,
concerning both the specific questions and the general judgment, is
characterizing the fact situation, as a whole or in regard to particular
parts, and placing the facts into "categories of legal thought."
These categories of legal thought, as all categories, represent con-
cepts, and it is such concepts and principles7 that aid the judge in
arriving at his solution to the problem. As pointed out previously,
the legal classification system is comprised of an unlimited number
of categories and contains within it the opportunity to create new
ones. While some attempts at scientific classification have been
made,8 0 and in civil law regimes a formal classification is necessarily
embodied in the codes, 81 in terms of problem-solving, the only relevant
classification system is that which exists in the mind of the individual
judge.12 And as between the different categories, even in a formalized
classification system, "the lines are dim, and there is much gray be-
tween the black and the white."8 3 So when we are talking about a
legal classification system, we are talking about "no more than a
logical or traditional ordering of the concepts, principles and rules
of the legal system into divisions and subdivisions of the law."8 4 More-
over, the categories are expressed in words, and, as we shall see, the
connotative meaning of the word describing the category may be very
significant.
The first step in "legal characterization" is probably to place the
fact situation into one or more of the branches or areas that are used to
divide up the category "law." We classify law in a number of ways de-
pending on our frame of reference. If the classification is on the basis
of governmental purpose, we distinguish between public law and
private law and also between civil and criminal. These generic areas
are further subdivided into more specific ones such as "constitu-
tional law," "tort," "contract" and the like. The characterization of
the fact situation into one of these areas of law is an automatic process,
79 A rule of law may best be defined as a narrow principle stating the relationship
between legal concepts. What we call principles of law, in contradistinction to rules,
differ only in degree of specificity when viewed from this perspective.
80 See generally Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1924).
81 See F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAw 142-45 (1955).
82 For an interesting discussion of judicial classification see Lederman, Classifica-
tion in Private International Law, 29 CAN. B. REV. 3, 5-9 (1951).
83 Harper, Torts, Contracts, Property, Status, Characterization, and The Conflict of
Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 441 (1959).
84 R. GRAVESON, THE CONFLICr Or LAws 38 (5th ed. 1965).
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often performed unconsciously, like breathing, and like breathing,
"one only becomes conscious of it when exceptional circumstances
make it difficult."85
Be that as it may, the fact situation has been subsumed into a
particular legal category contained in the judge's classification system.
Once this process has been performed, it becomes easier to take the
fact situation apart, and against the background of the category, to
identify the "legally relevant facts." Suppose that the case involves a
suit by A against B to recover damages resulting from B's failure to
deliver a ton of flour, as he allegedly promised to do. This fact situa-
tion would be characterized as giving rise to a problem in that area of
law which we call "contract." The category "contract" brings into
play certain associated responses and directs the judge toward those
concepts and principles that may be employed to solve "contract"
problems. By placing the fact stituation into that category the judge
is able to transfer the effects of past learning to the present. problem.,6
He will also be able to identify the "legally relevant facts" in light of
the concepts and principles applicable to the solution of "contract"
problems. For example, in determining whether the defendant is li-
able to the plaintiff for failing to deliver the flour, the defendant's
financial worth is not relevant, because the "contract rules" do not
differentiate on that basis. But the defendant's wealth may have been
a very significant factor in inducing the plaintiff to enter into the
agreement in the first place and to bring suit when it was not per-
formed.87 It is likewise not relevant in most contract cases that the
defendant's failure to perform was "without fault," whereas this fact
is very relevant in most "tort" cases. In other words, having focused
on the general area of law that will provide the basis of solution to
the problem, that is, on the "law of contract," the judge can select from
the total factual situation those specific facts that are relevant to the
concepts and principles that have been developed for the solution of
a "contracts" problem. The process of automatic and almost instinctive
characterization of fact situations into areas of law is understood by
every lawyer and judge, and is something that is performed many times
each day.
This kind of characterization must be distinguished from the
85 A. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 62 (1940).
86 See note 61 supra.
87 See the discussion in R. GRAVESON, supra note 84, at 39. If the plaintiff were suing
to recover for the commission of an intentional tort, the defendant's wealth would be
legally relevant, since it is a factor to be considered in assessing punitive damages.
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conscious and deliberate characterization of the fact situation into
areas of law, which, in certain circumstances, must be done. In the
days of formulary pleading, for example, it was necessary to consciously
place every fact situation into one of the areas of law correspond-
ing to the recognized forms of action. The lawyer had to think in
terms of whether the fact situation gave rise to a case of "trespass" or
"assumpsit" and the like before he could bring his suit at all.88 The
same thing must still be done in those states that operate under con-
solidated pleading.8 9 Apart from pleading, there are some circum-
stances in which the result will depend on the area of law into which
the fact situation is characterized. Suppose that a statute provides: "In
an action arising on contract, any other cause of action also arising on
contract, may be asserted as a counterclaim." In a suit to recover pay-
ment for merchandise, the defendant asserts a counterclaim arising
out of a fact situation in which the plaintiff allegedly converted the
defendant's property and resold it, retaining the proceeds. In order to
determine whether the counterclaim is proper, the court must ask
whether the counterclaim involves that area of law categorized as "con-
tract," since the legislature has defined the criteria for filing counter-
claims with reference to that concept.90 Most "rules of law" and "legal
principles" are not expressed at this high a level of abstraction, but
the "rule" that provides the solution to the problem at hand is, and
the judge must make a conscious characterization in order to apply it.
Another example of conscious characterization might be the case
when a passenger sues a carrier to recover damages resulting from an
accident during the course of the journey. Suit is brought three years
after the accident, and the statute of limitations provides that "suits
arising out of a contract shall be brought within five years from the
date of the wrong, and suits arising out of a tort shall be brought
within two years." In order to make a judgment on the particular
question-is the claim barred by limitation-it is necessary to char-
acterize the fact situation as either presenting a claim of "contract" or
of "tort," and this characterization will be dispositive of the result.91
Conscious characterization must also be made not infrequently be-
88 "The process of classification of English municipal law was historically far more
important than it is today; for formerly different rights had to be vindicated in different
courts of common law or equity, and the forms of action presented a formidable and
relentless incentive to litigants to follow the traditional and procedural classifications of
English law." Id. at 38.
89 For a recent attempt to use the form of action to influence the choice of law
determination see Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A,2d 796 (1964), and the
discussion notes 293-95 infra and accompanying text.
90 See Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929).
91 See Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
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tween "substantive law" and "procedure". A court may be authorized
to promulgate "rules of procedure," and it may be necessary to deter-
mine, for example, whether a rule requiring the physicial examination
of the plaintiff in a personal injury action is a "rule of procedure" so
that it falls within the court's competence. 2 So too, it is a "principle
of law" that "procedural" legislation may be made retroactive to events
occurring before it enactment, but that legislation affecting "substan-
tive rights" is prospective only. Is legislation changing the burden of
proof on the issue of contributory negligence "procedural" or "sub-
stantive" when it is sought to be applied to a case arising before its
enactment, but coming to trial subsequently?93 In these examples the
data to be characterized is, strictly speaking, a rule of law rather than
a fact situation, but the process works the same way, and the category
into which the rule is put will be dispositive of the result.
We have thus far been talking about characterization into area of
law categories. However, the process of characterization is performed
whenever the court subsumes any data into a particular category of
legal thought. Suppose that there are different rules of succession for
"movable" and "immovable" property.94 This kind of characterization
is necessary, because the appropriate rule of law is framed with refer-
ence to the categories, and once the characterization is made, the solu-
tion to the legal problem-who inherits the mortgage-follows. We
are also characterizing in the sense of subsuming a fact situation into
a legal category (here the term "concept" is probably more familiar to
us) whenever we must determine whether there was a "contract" or
a "marriage," and indeed, we are characterizing whenever we apply
the "law," which is necessarily based on concepts and principles, to a
particular fact situation.95
Until now we have purposely refrained from any discussion of
92 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
93 See Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 235 U.S. 380 (1914).
94 Note that this is an example of a problem calling for the exercise of a two-
category judgment. See note 74 supra.
95 Rules of law as we know them are precepts of human conduct employed as
a means of social control in a politically mature community. They must deal
with such non-legal realities or facts as persons, things, conduct and states of
mind. They operate by discriminating between different kinds of persons and
things, different kinds of conduct and states of mind, for purposes of defining
the entitlement of the persons concerned to certain legal rights, privileges,
powers or immunities. Laws then must contain notional categories of facts in
order to define or establish these classes of them for legal purposes. ...
The process of applying law to fact then depends on deciding which of
these neutral and non-legal facts are appropriate to the legal categories or classes
of facts defined in advance in our rules of law. . . . This process is frequently
called the subsumption of real facts under laws.
Lederman, supra note 82, at 5.
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how this process of characterization is performed, except to observe
that it is often done unconsciously in those circumstances in which
deliberate characterization is not required. Let us consider the ex-
ample of the suit against the carrier in which the suit will be barred
by limitation if it is characterized as involving a "tort," but will be
allowed if it is characterized as involving a "contract." The fact situa-
tion that the judge is characterizing represents "data to be judged,"
and as we have seen, data has no name and belongs to no category until
it is put into one.96 Just as the data "tomato" can be classified as a
"fruit" or a "vegetable" depending on the purpose of the classifica-
tion,9 so too, a passenger's claim against the carrier for personal in-
juries could be classified as a "tort" (we apply the category of "tort" to
unlawful conduct resulting in personal injury) or as a "contract" (the
injury occurred as a result of a contractual undertaking between the
parties). There is equal "logic" or "justification" for either classifica-
tion, and in fact such claims have been "characterized as 'contract' for
some purposes and 'tort' for others."9 8 In other words, although the
question is so framed that the answer depends on the category into
which the fact situation is characterized, there is no scientific or an-
alytical way to choose between the categories. We cannot solve the
problem except with reference to the context in which the character-
ization is to be made. We must consider the purpose for which the
distinction between "contract" and "tort" was drawn in the statute and
ask whether, in view of that purpose, a suit for personal injuries by a
passenger against a carrier more nearly corresponds to a suit on "con-
tract" or a suit for a "tort."'99 The necessity for "characterization in
context" is considered elementary by the psychologist or the seman-
ticist,10 0 and we are now realizing that this is true for legal thinking as
well and that the meaning of a legal term can be determined only in
reference to the context in which that term is being used.10 1
In order to illustrate this point, we may have been placing undue
emphasis on those relatively few situations in which conscious charac-
96 See note 71 supra.
97 See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
98 See the discussion in Ehrenzweig, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws: An
Unwelcome Addition to American Doctrine, in XXTH CENTURY 395, 398.
99 Since the statute of limitations for tort actions is generally shorter than that for
contracts, and since the great majority of tort cases involve claims for personal injuries,
it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended the shorter statute to apply in
personal injury suits against the carrier, and the courts have so held. See, e.g., Kozan v.
Comstock, 270 F2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
100 See particularly the discussion in S. HAYAKAWA, supra note 51, at 209-10.
101 See Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. Rav. 535 (1959).
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terization must be made, because the dispositive rules are framed in
terms of different areas of law. The more relevant characterization is
that which is performed unconsciously at the outset of a case, when
the judge places the fact situation into one or more of the areas of law
that comprise his classification system. In the ordinary domestic case,
it will make no observable difference whether the judge puts the fact
situation into one category or another. The norms for the decision of
that case will be found in the forum's statutory and decisional law, and
it may be assumed that somehow the judge will locate the "correct"
statutory provisions and judicial precedents (if for no other reason
than that the lawyers will cite them to him). His characterization will
probably affect only his initial search for the applicable law,10 2 and in
our suit by the passenger against the carrier, he may find the relevant
law indexed under "contract" or under "tort," probably under both,
and equally probably under the heading of "contracts of carriage: per-
sonal injuries." This does not mean that his characterization of the
problem as one of "tort" or of "contract" may not affect his analysis of
what facts are relevant and what rules of law are applicable, or in-
fluence his decision in a number of subtle and nonobservable ways.'03
But the characterization itself will not be determinative of the result,
and in view of other factors influencing his decision, will probably
not be of great significance. Therefore, in the purely domestic case
we may discount the importance of the judge's characterization of the
fact situation into a particular area of law, except when dispositive
rules have been framed on that basis. When the case contains a foreign
element, however, it has been a different matter altogether.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
A problem of the conflict of laws arises whenever a case contains
a foreign element, that is, whenever some or all of the legally signifi-
cant facts occurred in a jurisdiction other than that in which the suit
is brought and/or all the parties are not residents of the forum state.
The legal order, it is said, is decentralized among a plurality of
sovereign or autonomous authorities, each asserting jurisdiction within
a defined territory.10 4 But since people do not live their lives within
102 It would seem that even in a civil law system the location of the correct code
provision would not be dependent upon the judge's characterization.
103 Particularly in view of the associated responses that the stimulus of the different
area of law categories brings into play, as we shall discuss subsequently.
104 Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMp. L. 297
(1953).
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defined territories, disputes will invariably arise involving the territory
or people of two or more legal systems, and at that time "the legal
order tries to integrate the diversity of laws of which it is composed."' 10 5
The traditional approach toward "integrating that diversity" was
based upon "jurisdiction-selecting" rules, and these rules were framed
with reference to different categories or areas of law. Thus matters
of tort were determined by the law of the place of the wrong, 10 6
while matters of contract were determined by the law of the place
of contracting, 07 matters of property by the law of the situs, 08 and
the like.10 9 This meant that the fact situation had to be subsumed
into a particular category before the appropriate "jurisdiction-select-
ing" rule could be applied."0 In order for the system to work, then,
characterization became a conscious need,"' and the traditional ap-
proach has been described as one "which seeks to apply the established
choice of law rules to a particular case (involving a complex of facts
and domestic laws) by the process of classification or characteriza-
tion."1112
The characterization of the facts into a particular category, the
first step under the traditional approach, was called "characterization
of the principal question," and like characterization in the domestic
case, would often be performed "automatically and unconsciously." 113
When difficult questions arose, however, the courts became aware of
the conscious need to characterize, and we may consider some of the
problems that arose occurred with respect to characterization of the
principal question.
The leading case, which apparently sparked recognition of the
process, involved the Maltese widow who claimed a "poor spouse's
share" in her husband's Algerian land.114 Under Maltese law such a
claim was recognized, but it was not under French-Algerian law.
105 Id.
106 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
107 Id. § 311.
108 Id. § 208.
109 The sub-rules of the Restatement, on the whole, deal with how the particular
place is to be defined and with what particular questions are embraced by the general
rule.
110 See G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 40-41 (7th ed. 1965); Harper,
supra note 83, at 446.
111 Ehrenzweig, supra note 98, at 406.
112 Hancock, supra note 47, at 367.
113 See the discussion in G. CHESHIRE, supra note 110, at 41; Cormack, Renvoi,
Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws, 14 S.
CAL. L. REV. 221, 225 (1941).
114 Anton v. Bartolo, 18 JOURNAL Du DRoer INTERNATIONAL PIUVA 1171 (1891).
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Nevertheless, the Algerian court allowed the claim. It has been ex-
plained that this case demonstrates the process of characterization. If
the court had characterized the principal question as one of matrimo-
nial property, the choice of law rule would look to the personal law of
the parties, which under both French-Algerian and Maltese concepts
was the law of their nationality.115 Whereas, if the principal question
were characterized as one of succession to immovables, French-Algerian
law, as the law of the situs, would apply. The decision to allow the claim
meant that the court had characterized the principal question as
one of matrimonial property rather than succession to immovables.116
Professor Ehrenzweig says that this is a "mere rephrasing of the result
rather than a reasoned argument," and that "the case could have
easily been explained without resort to characterization, as one limit-
ing the forum rules which govern forum property, to nationals of
the forum state."117 In the same vein the result has been explained as
being in accord with the common policy of both states to afford some
financial protection for widows and that the court chose the line of
reasoning that gave effect to that policy."" Of course, either character-
ization is just as "logical" as the other, and even a proponent of
characterization such as Professor Robertson admits that this is so.119
His explanation is that the question was characterized as one of
matrimonial property by both the internal law of Malta and France,
and that the case held that insofar as French law was concerned, it
was characterized as matrimonial property for conflicts purposes as
well. As we have pointed out previously, data is unclassified until a
classification is made and the particular classification that is made
will depend on the purpose in classifying. The case does demonstrate
how analytical characterization could be employed with reference to
the result that the court desired to achieve. 120
A similar problem of characterization as marriage-succession would
115 Cf. In re Annesley [1926] Chan. 692.
116 The French commentator, Bartin, used this case as the first example in his
classic article on characterization. Bartin, De l'impossibilitd d'arriver ii la supression dd-
finitive des conflits de lois, 24 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL PsuvA 225 (1897).
117 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 330-31.
118 Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 1027, 1031-34
(1949).
119 A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 159-62. He contends that both states characterized
the question as one of matrimonial property.
120 See the discussion in Hancock, supra note 47, at 366. Disingenuous characteriza-
tion was a very effective manipulative technique by which the forum could achieve
the application of its own law. Sedler, supra note 6, at 49-50.
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arise when the issue was whether a will was revoked by a subsequent
marriage (if characterized as marriage, it would be governed by the
personal law of the decedent at the time of marriage,' 21 but if charac-
terized as succession, it would be governed by the personal law of the
decedent at the time of death as to movables and by the law of the
situs as to immovables), or when it was whether a widow was required
to elect between dower and rights under a will concerning land
located elsewhere (if characterized as marriage, or more accurately,
marital property, it would be governed by the personal law, but if
characterized as succession, it would be governed by the law of the
situs). 122 A problem of characterization of the principal question would
also be presented when a decedent had made a gift causa mortis
of movable property. If the principal question were characterized as
one of movable property, the choice of law rule would look to the
situs of the property at the time of the transfer, but if it were charac-
terized as one of succession, the law of the decedent's domicile at the
time of death would govern. 123
The contract-tort characterization has been presented in suits by a
passenger against a carrier to recover for personal injuries and in actions
for breach of contract to marry. In the suit against the carrier, if the
principal question were characterized as one of contract, the law of
the place of making would govern whereas if it were characterized as
one of tort, it would be the law of the place of injury.124 In the action
for breach of a contract to marry, the choice was between the law of the
place where the contract was made (contract) and the law of the place
where the defendant committed the wrong, e.g., the place where the
marriage was to take place or where the defendant repudiated (tort). 25
A contract-property characterization problem would occur when a
contract to transfer land was made in a state other than the situs,
and the issue was whether the law of the place of contracting(contract)
or the law of the situs (property) would govern. 126 When the trans-
feror and transferee were husband and wife and the substantive issue
was the capacity of one to make the transfer to the other, the charac-
121 Note that under the law of many continental states this was the law of na-
tionality as opposed to the law of the domicile.
122 See the discussion in A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 219-20.
123 See the discussion in G. CHESHIRE, supra note 110, at 45. See also A. ROBERTSON,
supra note 85, at 185, in which the position is taken that gifts causa mortis should "form
a category of their own with their own choice of law rule."
124 See the discussion in Ehrenzweig, supra note 98, at 397-98.
125 See generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 76-78; Harper, Supra note 83, at
441.
126 See the discussion in A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 217-19.
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terization problem could be framed in terms of family law-contract-
property.1 27
As we have said, the rules of the traditional approach were framed
with reference to different areas of law, so that once the principal ques-
tion was characterized, a particular choice of law rule necessarily fol-
lowed, such as "matters of tort are determined by the law of the place
of the wrong." Most of the choice of law rules did not themselves
require further characterization, but some did in that the facts had
to be subsumed under a particular category other than area of law
ones. For example, one of the rules was that "the formalities of mar-
riage are determined by the law of the place of celebration and the
substantive validity is determined by the law of the marital domi-
cile.' 128 Suppose that under the law of the state of celebration parental
consent is not required, but it is required under the law of the marital
domicile. If parental consent is characterized as a formality the mar-
riage is valid, but if it is characterized as a matter going to substantive
validity, the marriage is not.129 The same kind of problem would be
involved when the choice of law rule was that a will would be valid if
it complied with the form prescribed by the state of execution, al-
though substantive validity was to be determined by the law governing
succession. Did the matter of a holographic will, for example, go to
formal or substantive validity?1 0 In all of these cases, the characteriza-
tion, that is, the subsuming of the factual situation under the concept
of "form" or "substance," would determine the result. In a sense, this
involved the same kind of characterization that occurs whenever the
court subsumes a fact situation under a legal concept, but here it was
complicated by the question of whether the characterization was to be
determined by the law of the forum or the law of the other state, as
we shall discuss shortly.
The third possible step would be characterization of the connect-
ing factor or "contact point." Since each rule looked to a particular
place, such as the place of the wrong, it would be necessary in a
127 Compare Swank v. Hufnagle, 111 Ind. 453, 12 N.E. 303 (1897) with Poison v.
Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897) and Smith v. Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40 S.E. 984
(1902). See notes 355-61 infra and accompanying text.
128 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 121, 132 (1934).
129 Compare Ogden v. Ogden, [1908] P. 46 (CA.) with Simonin v. Mallac, 164 Eng.
Rep. 917 (Prob. 1860). See also J. FALCONBRIDGE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 74-86 (2d ed. 1954);
A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 239-45; Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or
Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743, 756-58 (1941).
130 See J. FALCONBRIDCE, supra note 129, at 90-94; A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85,
at 234-38.
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particular case to determine what that place was. The classic example
is the characterization of the place of the wrong in tort cases when the
wrongful act occurred in one state and the harm resulting from that
act occurred in another.131 It is interesting to note that in this country
the place of the wrong was characterized as the place where the harm
occurred while in a number of European countries it was the place
where the actor acted.132 Similarly, there would be a question con-
cerning the place of contracting when the purported offer and accep-
tance took place by mail or over the telephone. 133
The three steps outlined above were referred to as "primary
characterization." It was sometimes considered a two-stage rather than
a three-stage process, with application of the choice of law rule and
characterization of the contact point being considered a single stage.134
Once the "governing jurisdiction" was selected, the next step was to
determine how much of its law was to be applied, and this was referred
to as "secondary characterization."' 35 This would often involve charac-
terization of a rule of law, either one of the forum or of the locus"36
or both. For example, since one of the rules was that "the law of
the forum governs matters of procedure, ' "37 it was necessary to deter-
mine whether a particular rule of the forum was a matter of "proce-
dure," in which case it would be applied, or whether a rule of the
locus was one of "procedure," in which case it would not.138 Secondary
characterization might also involve the question of whether a rule
131 See the discussion and examples in Harper, supra note 83, at 442-45.
132 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934) and the discussion in Alabama
Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). Compare the tort rule
of the Italian Civil Code, Art. 25, in McCusker, The Italian Rules of the Conflict of
Laws, 25 TUL. L. REv. 70, 81-82 (1950) with the Greek Civil Code, Art. 26, in Nicoletop-
oulos, Private International Law in the New Greek Civil Code, 23 TUL. L RrV. 452
(1949).
133 See Linn v. Employers Reins. Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638 (1958).
134 See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 19-22.
135 Id. at 118-19.
136 "Locus" means the state whose law was chosen to govern under the appropriate
choice of law rule.
137 RSTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 585 (1934).
138 See the discussion in Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in
Private International Law, 15 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L. LAw 46, 66-71 (1934). In Marrie v.
Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883), the forum concluded that its statute
of frauds was substantive and that the statute of the locus was procedural. There-
fore, it disallowed the defense and enforced a contract that was invalid under both
the law of the forum and the law of the locus. The matter of characterizing tl~e
statute of frauds is discussed in Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of
Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 311 (1923).
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of the locus was applicable extraterritorially1 39 The lines between
"primary" and "secondary" characterization were not always clear,140
but for our purposes141 we may generally consider secondary character-
ization as involving "delimitation of the proper law."'142 The function
of primary characterization, then, was to locate the appropriate juris-
diction the law of which was to govern, while the function of secon-
dary characterization was to define how much of the law of that
jurisdiction was to be applied. 43
The characterization that took place under the traditional ap-
proach was necessarily analytical since that approach was based on
"logic" and represented an attempt to find an' "objective solution"
for all conflicts problems.144 But, as with most elements of the tradi-
tional approach, there was disagreement on how the logic should
operate. This gave rise to conflicts of characterization and the problem
of how those conflicts were to be resolved. Let us consider briefly
how such conflicts would arise and what problems would then be
presented. Suppose that a contract of carriage was entered into in
State A and an accident happened during the course of the journey
in State B. Under the substantive law of State A, the carrier would
not be liable; under the substantive law of State B, however, it would
be liable. Suit is brought in State A. State A must first characterize the
principal question, and it characterizes suits by a passenger against a
carrier to recover for personal injuries as "tort." The "tort" choice of
law rule looks to the place of injury, State B. But if State B charac-
terizes the principal question as one of "contract," the applicable
choice of law rule would look to the place of contracting, State A.
In the above example State A and State B have the same choice of
law rules, but the differing characterization of the principal question
would cause each to apply a different choice of law rule in that case.
Since each state is looking to the other, the problem of the renvoi
is presented, which most American courts resolved by "rejecting the
139 See the discussion in Beckett, supra note 138, at 72-75.
140 And it was a matter of some dispute whether the distinction should be drawn
at all. For a suggested approach see Lederman, supra note 82, at 3, 168, 174-75.
141 Which are only to explain the workings of traditional characterization.
142 A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 118.
143 As a practical matter this states the approach advocated by Robertson. Com-
pare the approach advocated by J. FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 129, at 50-53 with Lederman,
supra note 82.
144 See the discussion in A. EHIENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 330-31; Nussbaum, Book
Review, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1464-66 (1940).
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renvoi" and applying the substantive law of the locus. 14 5 If, on the
other hand, State A characterized the principal question as one of
"contract" and State B characterized it as one of "tort," the question
would be whether characterization was to be determined by State A
law or State B law, and the resolution of this problem might depend
on whether suit was brought in State A or State B.146
The same problem could arise with respect to characterization
of the contact point. Suppose in the above example that the negligent
act of the carrier occurred in State A and the injury occurred in State
B. Let us also assume that both states characterize the principal ques-
tion as one of tort and apply the tort choice of law rule that the law
of the place of the wrong governs. It is necessary for the forum to
characterize the place of the wrong, because the elements of the tort,
i.e. the act and the injury, occurred in different states. If State A
characterizes the place of the wrong as the place where the harm oc-
curred and State B characterizes it as the place where the wrongful act
occurred, there is again a conflict of characterization.
Conflicts of secondary characterization would not arise until after
the forum had decided that the substantive law of another state should
apply. Here the question would be whether a rule of the locus should
be applied by tthe forum, and the conflict would arise because the
forum and the locus disagreed on the applicability of that rule to a
case containing a foreign element. Suppose, for example, that the
forum characterizes the rules represented by the statute of frauds as
"substantive." This would mean not only that it would not apply its
own statute of frauds, but that it would decide the statute of frauds
issue solely with reference to the statute of the locus. The locus,
however, characterizes its statute of frauds as "procedural,"' 147 thus
making it inapplicable except when suit is brought there. The question
is whether the forum will apply the statute of frauds of the locus
notwithstanding the characterization of the statute by the locus as
"procedural.' 48
145 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 7(b) (1934); 1 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws 55-58 (1935).
146 See notes 155-57 infra and accompanying text.
147 In determining how a statute was characterized by the locus, the forum often
failed to consider whether the characterization had been made for local law pur-
poses or for conflicts purposes. See, e.g., Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946).
148 The Restatement position was that it should not, even if the forum's own
statute were characterized as substantive. See Marrie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210




The solution to these problems of characterization was considered
to revolve around two related questions: (1) what was the source of
the "concepts of characterization;" (2) was characterization to be deter-
mined by the law of the forum or the law of the locus. A number of
writers took the position that the forum should generally apply its
own legal concepts to the process of characterization. 149 This was
justified on the ground that otherwise the forum would lose its control
over the choice of law determination. If, for example, the forum's
conflicts rule was that the law of the place of the wrong governed
matters of tort liability, and some other state's law determined what
the place of wrong was, the forum's purpose in selecting the place of
the wrong rule might be subverted. 50
But while the forum applied its own concepts, categories for
conflicts purposes were necessarily broader than those employed for
local law purposes to encompass foreign institutions unknown to the
forum.' 5' Thus, the concept of "contract," for example, would include
consensual transactions that were binding and enforceable under a
foreign legal system, although the same consensual transaction would
not be considered a contract under the law of the forum, e.g., when the
forum would require a technical consideration, but the locus would
not.1 52 So too, the category of "property" would include community
property, although that institution was not recognized in the forum.15 3
And the notion of what was a "penal law" for internal law purposes
might not be the same when the issue was whether a foreign law
would be refused enforcement on the ground that it was "penal.' 54
The source of the concepts of characterization, then, was the
conflicts law of the forum, 55 and just as each state had its own system
of conflicts law, it had to work out its own system of categories for
conflicts purposes. 56 Although these categories were considered in-
ternational there still could be, as we have seen, a difference between
the international categories of the forum and those of the locus, so
149 See the discussion in G. CHESHIRE, supra note 110, at 42; Cormack, supra note
113, at 226-31; Harper, supra note 83, at 442; Lederman, supra note 82, at 23-29.
150 Harper, supra note 83, at 442.
151 See the discussion in A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 89-91.
152 See the discussion in Lederman, supra note 82, at 25-26.
153 See the discussion in G. CHESHIRE, supra note 110, at 42-43.
154 See the discussion in Harper, supra note 83, at 750.
155 For a discussion of the meaning of conflicts law of the forum as it is related
to characterization, see J. FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 129, at 70 and Husserl, The Foreign
Fact Element in the Conflict of Laws, 26 VA. L. REv. 243, 259-62, 453, 455-57 (1940). See
also 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAwS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 53-66 (2d ed. 1958).
158 See the discussion of categories in A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 83-91.
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the more important question, both with respect to primary and
secondary characterization, was whether it should be determined by
the law of the forum or the law of the locus. There appeared to be
general agreement among the commentators that matters of primary
characterization should be determined by the forum since the forum
has to "control" the choice of law determination. 57 But concerning
secondary characterization, some commentators argued that this should
be decided in accordance with the law of the locus, since it involved
the applicability of locus law,158 while others took the position that
the characterization of the locus should be considered, but that here
too, the forum had to make the final determination. 5 9 This is perhaps
an oversimplification of the differing views, but it does illustrate the
kinds of questions that arose under traditional characterization and
the opinions of how they should be resolved. 60
The practical utility of the process of characterization was a
matter of some dispute, even during the zenith of the traditional ap-
proach. 6' It was contended that characterization was merely "synony-
mous with selection of the proper law," and that a court did not
arrive at its decision by classifying the issue to "reveal the appropriate
conflict rule which, on the application of a specific connecting factor,
will result in the selection of the proper law to be applied.' ' 6 2 It was
also pointed out that, in practice, conflicts of characterization were
relatively few and that a court would not make decisions on the basis
of "over-refined doctrines.' 1 68 Another viewpoint was that character-
ization "merely veiled the processes whereby results are reached," and
that the court would characterize in such a way as to reach the result
157 R. GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 41, 49, 54 (2d ed. 1965); A. ROBERTSON, supra
note 85, at 157-58; Lorenzen, supra note 129, at 761; cf. J. FALCONBRIDCE, supra note
129, at 58-72.
158 G. CHESHIRE, supra note 110, at 48-49; A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 130-34.
159 Beckett, supra note 138, at 72-75; Lorenzen, supra note 129, at 758-61.
160 Another aspect of traditional characterization was characterization of the pre-
liminary question, which essentially involved the reference to foreign law to determine
factual questions, e.g., did a person claiming to be the wife of the decedent have that
status under the law of another state. See generally A. ROBrRrSON, supra note 85, at 135-
57; Gotlieb, The Incidental Question in Anglo-American Conflict of Laws, 33 CAN. B.
R.EV. 523 (1955). The matter is currently treated under the heading of "foreign law as
datum." Ehrenzweig, Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws: Terra Incognits,
16 BUFF. L. Rav. 55 (1966); Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, 53 CALIF. L.
Rav. 47 (1965). The relevancy of the "incidental question" to identification of the
problem area is discussed in notes 359-60 infra and accompanying text.
161 Professor Ehrenzweig has contended that American courts did not become con-
cerned with the doctrine until fairly late in its history. Ehrenzweig, supra note 98, at 395-96.
162 Bland, Classification Re-Classified, 6 INT. & CoMP. L.Q. 10, 27 (1957).
163 Nussbaum, supra note 144, at 1471.
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that it considered desirable.1 6 4 Certainly we are aware of the use of
"disingenuous characterization" to achieve the application of the
forum's law,165 and as pointed out previously, 16 6 from an analytical
standpoint most fact situations, rules of law and the like could just
as well be put in one category as another. And of course, insofar as
characterization was considered to be the basis of the traditional
approach, 167 it was subject to criticism on that ground as the defi-
ciencies of that approach became more evident. The death-knell was
sounded by Professor Ehrenzweig, who observed that: "With the sub-
stitution for overgeneralized psuedo-rules, of a catalogue of specific
and policy-based exceptions from the lex fori, the technique of charac-
terization will have lost both its promise and its threat, as well as its
principal merit as a 'fascinating intellectual exercise.' P,168
It is obvious that the premises upon which the traditional charac-
terization process rested are totally inapplicable to a policy-centered
approach. In the absence of jurisdiction-selecting rules for each cate-
gory of law, there is no need to "characterize the principal question"
in order to locate the relevant "choice of law rule."'1 69 Since the court
under a policy-centered approach would no longer be applying "rules,"
there is no occasion to characterize concepts contained within a rule,
such as "formality" and "substantial validity."'170 Nor would it focus
on a particular conceptual place such as the "place of the wrong,"
thereby avoiding problems of characterization of the contact point.
The abandonment of a rules approach also avoids conflicts of primary
characterization and the resulting renvoi problem.' 7'
The kind of questions involved in "conflicts of secondary charac-
terization" remain, since they involve delimitation of the chosen law,
and arise whenever the forum has decided that its law should be dis-
placed. But under a policy-centered approach their solution will not
be dependent upon how a rule of law or particular property is
164 Morse, supra note 118, at 1029.
165 See note 120 supra.
166 See the discussion notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
167 See the discussion notes 106-12 supra and accompanying text.
168 Ehrenzweig, supra note 98, at 408.
169 It is interesting to note that characterization is still required under the modern
rules approach of the Restatement Second. See REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) § 7.
170 Apart from the subsumption of facts under concepts that takes place in any
legal situation.
171 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 7 and particularly the comments thereto. See the
discussion in Weintraub, The Impact of a Functional Analysis upon the "Pervasive
Problems" of the Conflict of Laws, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 817, 828-33 (1968) and the dis-
cussion notes 38, 39 supra and accompanying text. Again it is interesting to note that
the problem of the renvoi remains under the modem rules approach.
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"characterized." The analytical "substance-procedure" dichotomy does
not represent a functionally sound solution to the question of how
much of the law of the locus should be carried over, and the courts
are moving to the position that matters materially affecting the out-
come will be determined by the law of the locus, whether analytically
"substantive" or "procedural," except where the incorporation of locus
"procedural" law would be impractical or would violate a strong pro-
cedural policy of the forum.172 The "movable-immovable" distinction,
which could be considered as involving both primary and secondary
characterization, is relevant only insofar as it determines what portion
of the law of the situs may be applicable. If the courts take the posi-
tion that the law of the situs should control the disposition of property
situate there173-- and there is a trend away from the strict application
of the situs rule' 74-the only relevant consideration is what disposition
the situs would have made. There need be no concern with whether
the forum or the situs decides how the property should be classified.' 75
Therefore, it is clear that the process of characterization, as it was
employed under the traditional approach, becomes totally irrelevant
to the policy-centered conflict of laws.
V. THE PROCESS OF CHARACTERIZATION TRANSFORMED:
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM AREA AND THE
POLICY-CENTERED CONFLICT OF LAWS
It should not be surprising that the basis of the traditional ap-
proach to the solution of conflicts problems revolved around classifica-
tion. A conflicts case, as has been observed, is merely a case to which
a foreign element has been added. 7 6 A case involving a contract made
172 Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the
Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 813, 821-25 (1962).
173 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 215-22, 254a (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959).
174 See, e.g., Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law
Process-Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1126 (1960); Hancock, Conceptual
Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1967);
Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of "Situs" as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1966).
175 See W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 305-10
(1942). Likewise questions of escheat should not depend on whether the situs of the
property treats the government as an heir, as in Estate of Maldonado, [1954] P. 223,
248, 251. For a discussion of the devolution of property to adopted children see Ehrenz-
weig, supra note 98, at 402-03.




between people of different states, for example, is still a case involving
a contract, and the only additional task imposed upon the court is
to determine the significance that will be given to the presence of
the foreign element.177 Because there is the tendency to compartmen-
talize, and because classification is "indispensable to thought,"'178 it
would be expected that the "jurisdiction-selecting" rules developed
under the traditional approach would be framed with reference to the
different areas of law recognized in domestic cases. Thus there were
conflicts rules for tort, contract, property and the like, and the classifi-
cation performed unconsciously and automatically in the domestic case
became a conscious necessity in the foreign one in order to locate the
correct "jurisdiction-selecting" rule.
Under a policy-centered approach, of course, this kind of con-
scious and formalized classification-characterization is no longer neces-
sary. But what about classification itself? Since the judges classify the
domestic case into different areas of law, whether consciously or un-
consciously, there is no reason to believe they will act any differently
when confronted with a case containing a foreign element. If this is so,
and since classification, in theory at least, was result-determinative
under the traditional approach, it is important to consider whether
decisions in conflicts cases may still be affected by the fact that the
judge will necessarily classify cases into areas of law.
I think that the answer is in the affirmative, and this brings us
to the matter of the set. A set may be defined as a readiness to make
a specified response to a specified stimulus, so that when the stimulus
is received, certain responses are selected from the repertoire of avail-
able responses rather than others. 179 A set may be established experi-
mentally, such as telling a person that he will hear a telephone ring
with the result that he is likely to interpret a ringing sound as a
telephone, although it is in fact a doorbell. 180 More to the point is
the significance of the set for problem-solving. It is clear that the set
with which a person approaches a problem may influence the solution
at which he eventually arrives. The responses produced during prob-
lem-solving are not random, and something like a set makes some re-
sponses more probable than others. A set, then, involves the correlation
177 Previously referred to elsewhere as a threshold question and the observation
made that: "While the threshold question may ultimately be dispositive of the case,
the court is, nonetheless, anxious to get on with a determination on the merits." Sedler,
supra note 6, at 54.
178 See the discussion notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text.
179 D. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 65.
180 Id. at 73.
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between preparation and response. This correlation has been demon-
strated experimentally and is equally applicable to the solution of
complex problems, such as those requiring an abstract judgment.,'
The first thing we do when we are confronted with a problem is
to "look the situation over.' '18 2 The data representing the problem is
organized and perhaps classified. The problem then becomes struc-
tured, and the structure of the problem becomes the effective environ-
ment within which productive thought will operate. The thinker will
respond to the problem situation as he has organized it,183 and this
organization is likely to result in a set toward some aspects of the
problem to the exclusion of others. To the extent that the thinker
has established a set, he has defined the goal response, and this "search
model" acts as a center, facilitating the production of responses close
to the center and inhibiting deviate responses. 8 4
When a lawyer or a judge looks at a problem, I would suggest
that probably his initial reaction is to classify the problem into one
or more of the areas of law that comprise his classification system, e.g.,
this client has a contract problem, this is a tort case. In so doing he
has put the problem-the data-into a category, and this category may
establish a set that will influence his solution to the problem. Under
the traditional approach to the solution of conflicts problems the set-
response pattern was formalized, and was the basis of this "classificatory
approach."'' 1 5 The first step in solving the problem-the preparation
-was placing the problem into a category, and the set created by
the category produced a response that in theory was determinative of
the result. If, for example, the judge placed the problem into the
category "tort," the response (produced by the stimulus "tort") was to
invoke the "rule" that the law of the place of the wrong governed.
Whereas if he had placed the problem into the category "contract,"
the response would be to invoke the "rule" that the law of the place
of contracting governed. The set "tort" produced the "tort response"
-law of the place of the wrong.
With the abandonment of jurisdiction-selecting rules, the stimulus
will not produce a response framed in terms of "rules," but it may
produce other responses that will influence the choice of law decision.
If I am right in my view that classification necessarily takes place,
181 Id. at 157-58.
182 Id. at 159-60.
183 Id. at 160.
184 Id. at 188.
185 See note 112 supra.
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consciously or unconsciously, the effect of such classification upon the
ultimate choice of law decision must be considered. The classification
is a part of the judge's organization of the problem, and through the
ordinary psychological processes of thought and judgment, is likely to
establish a set. This set in turn will produce certain responses to the
exclusion of others, which may influence the judge's solution to the
problem.
Let me now relate this to judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws. Since my position is that the courts must develop a
body of conflicts law based upon considerations of policy and fairness
through decisions in individual cases, I must be concerned with how
judges will arrive at those decisions. Any decision is influenced by the
set with which the thinker approaches the problem he must resolve. If
I am right in my view that judges and lawyers do classify problems into
areas of law, I must take as my starting point the set that results from
such classification and how this set may produce certain responses that
will influence the choice-of-law determination.
I will explore this process from the perspective of a judge com-
mitted to a policy-centered approach for the solution of conflicts
problems.1 8 6 When a conflicts problem 87 comes before this judge for
decision, he will use his classification system, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to identify the problem as one of "tort" or "contract" or the
like just as he would in a domestic case. Under the traditional ap-
proach, this would be called "characterization of the principal ques-
tion," so in order to avoid confusion and also to describe it more real-
istically, I will call this "process identification of the problem area."
The categories of tort, contract, and the like, as any categories, are con-
cepts and have symbolic meaning to the thinker.18 8 The symbolic mean-
ing may be considered a set, which produces associated responses. Since
the frame of reference of our judge is one of policy, these responses will
relate to the policies and purposes embodied in that area of law we
call tort or contract. In terms of policies and purposes, the words
contract and tort-their connotative meanings' 8 -- conjure up differ-
ent things. When we think of tort, we think of affording compensa-
186 The policy-centered approach may be called the judge's frame of reference. As
to the proper definition of frame of reference and the distinction between frame of
reference and set, see D. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 109-10, 314-17.
187 I use the term "problem" rather than "case" to emphasize that a conflicts
question frequently arises only with respect to a particular issue or issues in a case.
188 For a discussion of symbolism see S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEw KEY 284-86
(3d ed. 1957).
189 For a discussion of connotative meaning see S. HAYAKAWA, supra note 51, at
58-60.
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tion to injured persons and of inhibiting socially undesirable conduct,
the policies of compensation and deterrence. 190 When we think of con-
tract, we think of the policy of protecting the legitimate expectations
of the parties and of insuring stability in commercial transactions.
When we think of property, we think of protection of acquired inter-
ests, and so on. I would submit that the judge must be aware of how
his thinking may be influenced by the set that has resulted from his
identification of the problem area. To the extent that identification
of the problem area is articulated and understood, the policies to be
implemented by the different areas of law will be sharply focused, and
those that are relevant will come to the fore. The judge who sees the
problem as one of tort will be emphasizing different policies than the
judge who sees it as one of contract. In any event, we must recognize
the different responses that result from the sets that different identifica-
tions of the problem area will produce. To me this is sufficient reason
to justify the conscious articulation of identification of the problem
area by courts committed to the policy-centered approach.
But I think there is an even more important reason, which relates
to the effect of the set in the choice of law context. Whether as a
vestige of the traditional jurisdiction-selective approach, or as part of
our territorial bias,"" or perhaps from a tendency to relate areas of
law to particular geographical quotients, the set resulting from iden-
tification of the problem area may produce the response that the law
of a particular state should apply. If the judge sees the problem as
one of tort, this "tort set" may produce the response that the law
of the state where the harm occurred or where the wrongful act was
done should govern. If he sees the problem as one of "property," he
may be influenced toward the law of the situs, especially where im-
movable property is involved.192 If the problem is one of "family
law," that stimulus may produce the response of "law of the domicile."
This "localization factor" will be stronger in some areas of law than
in others, but it is always potentially present. This is all the more
reason for the judge to precisely identify and articulate the problem
area that he considers to be involved.
I want to take this aspect of identification a step further and relate
it to the methodology that I think should be followed. I think that this
stimulus-response pattern may be functionally sound in that it may
190 For a discussion of the characteristics of a tort see W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS
4-7 (3d ed. 1964).
191 See the discussion in D. CAvERsi supra note 21, at 134-36.
192 It is customary to refer to the "land taboo." See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 174.
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lead the judge to the state that, based upon considerations of policy
and fairness, would apparently have an interest in having its law ap-
plied to resolve that kind of problem. In the case of a "tort" problem,
for example, the state where the injury or wrongful act occurred
seemingly would have an interest in having its law applied. Likewise
the domicile of the concerned party in the case of a "family law"
problem or the situs in a "property" problem seemingly would have
such an interest. That does not mean that another state may not be
interested as well, but at least we have come up with a seemingly
interested state, and perhaps our choice of law inquiry should begin
there.
I call this state the state of primary reference, the state that under
a policy-centered approach would seemingly have an interest in having
its law applied to the issue in question. In other words, based upon
his identification of the problem area, the judge may be led to state
the law and policy that he should consider first. It is at this point
that the difference between characterization of the principal question
under the traditional approach and identification of the problem area
under the policy-centered approach presents itself most significantly.
Under the traditional approach the set resulting from the classification
produced an automatic response, the application of a particular choice
of law rule. The law of the state chosen under the jurisdiction-selecting
rule governed, and that was the end of the matter. Under the policy-
centered approach, of course, there is no notion of governing law.
Identification of the problem area may lead the judge to the state of
primary reference, and its law is consulted first because it is the
state that seemingly would have an interest in having its law applied
to resolve the issue. But no choice of law rule *follows from identifica-
tion of the problem area and localization of the state of primary
reference. Depending on the result that would occur if the law of
that state were applied, the policies and interests of other states may
have to be considered, and the court may end up applying the law of
a state other than the state of primary reference. Identification and
localization, then, serve as a guide to the solution of conflicts problems
rather than as the solution itself. But, as I will try to demonstrate,
this guide is very useful in helping the court to arrive at sound
solutions.
To recapitulate, under the policy-centered approach, as I have de-
fined it, a judge faced with the necessity of deciding a conflicts case 193
193 Note that under our view a conflicts case arises only when the -state, the
application of whose law is urged by one of the parties, would apply its own law
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should proceed as follows. He should first identify the problem area
that he believes to be presented by the issue on which there are dif-
fering laws. This is accomplished by a consideration of the kinds of
policies reflected by the laws in question and whether they are properly
denominated as tort policies or contract policies or the like. The
number of potential categories is limitless, and the particular label he
puts on the problem area is not important. What is important is that
the precise policies be identified and that the set with which the judge
is approaching the problem be made clear. Identification of the prob-
lem area may lead the judge to a state of primary reference. He would
first look to the law of that state, and depending on what that law is
and the effect of its application, he may be able to resolve the choice
of law question. But that inquiry may indicate that the policies and
interests of other states may have to be considered as well. If so, a de-
cision must be made concerning which interest will be preferred and
which law should be applied in the fact-law pattern of the particular
case.
My thesis is that proper identification of the problem area will
help the court to achieve sound results in conflicts cases based upon
considerations of policy and fairness. In the remainder of the writing
I hope to demonstrate the utility of this methodology.
VI. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM AREA UNDER A POLICY-CENTERED
APPROACH: THE ANATOMY OF JuDciAL DECISION
I propose to illustrate the matter of identification of the problem
area and its relation to judicial decision by a consideration of three
kinds of identification situations. The first is the situation in which
recovery is sought for the commission of a tort, but where the precise
issue on which there is a conflict may involve a problem area other
than that which we call tort. The second situation revolves around
disputes over consensual arrangements in which the issue to be resolved
may depend upon considerations other than those associated with en-
forcing such arrangements. The third concerns property cases in which
considerations other than those associated with that area of law called
property may be involved. For want of any better nomenclature,
we will call these situations "tort-something," "contract-something"
and "property-something." Although there is perhaps a descending
order of significance, all the situations will illustrate, perhaps in differ-
ent ways, the thesis.
if the case arose there rather than look to the law of the forum. See the discussion




It is sometimes said that the "revolution" in conflicts law has been
limited to "tort cases,"'194 that is, cases in which the plaintiff is suing to
recover damages for the commission of a tort. The effect of the "revo-
lution" has been either to apply the law of a state other than that where
the injury occurred, usually the law of the state where both the plaintiff
and the defendant reside, or when the law of the state of injury is still
applied, it is on grounds other than the mere fact that the injury oc-
curred there. The case that "started the revolution" is generally con-
sidered to be Grant v. McAuliffe, 195 in which the California Supreme
Court, in a suit between a California plaintiff and the estate of a de-
ceased Californian arising out of an automobile accident occurring in
Arizona, refused to apply the Arizona rule that tort actions did not
survive the death of the tortfeasor. The California court did not aban-
don the traditional approach in that case, conceding that the law of
the place of injury should govern questions of tort liability. It justi-
fied the application of California law on two grounds. First, it held
that whether a cause of action survived the death of the tortfeasor was
a matter of "procedure," to be determined by the law of the forum.
Secondly, it characterized the principal question as one of "decedents'
estates," so that the applicable choice of law rule looked to the de-
cedent's domicile at the time of death, which again was California.
Policy-centered commentators, while approving the decision, explain
the court's action as manipulating the machine to achieve a "desirable
result,"'196 and Justice Traynor, who wrote the opinion, seemingly ad-
mitted that this is what was done.197 Certainly whether a cause of action
survives would not be a matter of procedure, even under the tradi-
tional substance-procedure dichotomy, let alone under the outcome-de-
terminative test. 98 But let us take a closer look at the court's "character-
ization of the principal question," and ask whether the court was really
being so "manipulative" in treating the problem as one of "decedents'
estates."
The issue on which there was a conflict of laws arose because of
the fact that the tortfeasor was dead. The defense asserted was one of
immunity, and the legally significant fact giving rise to the claim of
immunity was that of death. This being so, the policy behind the
194 Ehrenzweig, A Counterrevolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80
HARV. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1966).
195 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
196 See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 138-40; A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at
332.
197 Traynor, supra note 42, at 670 n.35.
198 Sedler, supra note 172, at 837.
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immunity provided by Arizona law must have something to do with
death: the fact of death causes Arizona to depart from the policy re-
flected in its tort law that a person injured by the wrongful act of
another is entitled to compensation. The legitimate policy represented
by such a rule 9 9 would seem to be one of protecting the heirs and
beneficiaries of the deceased tortfeasor from suffering a reduction in
their estate because of the acts of the decedent during his lifetime. 2°o
This policy has nothing to do with any policy to be implemented by
that area of law we call "tort," and indeed is directly antithetical to
the "tort" policies of compensation and deterrence. It has everything
to do with the policies to be implemented by that area of law we call
decedents' estates, most particularly the policy that upon a person's
death his property pass to those designated by him, or in default of
such designation, to his heirs. In other words the problem area pre-
sented by a no-survival rule is not one of tort at all since the policies
justifying the immunity are not tort policies, but policies relating to
the distribution of estates of decedents. 201
We now return to the matter of the set. The judge who views a
no-survival rule as involving a tort question approaches the issue with
the "tort set," and the stimulus of this set may impel him, considering
our territorial bias, to look to the law of the state of injury because it
is assumed that the state of injury has an interest in applying its law
to the tort that has occurred there. But if he does not view the rule as
presenting a tort problem, the impetus to look to the law of the state
of injury is not the same. If he realizes that the policy objectives to be
achieved by a no-survival rule are policies relating to the distribution
of decedents' estates, he approaches the question with a different set,
and a set that may cause him to look to the law of the decedent's domi-
cile since we generally believe that the law of the decedent's domicile
should determine the distribution of his personal estate.2 02 Depending
on how the judge identifies the problem area, consciously or un-
consciously, a different set may be created, and that set may influence
his choice of law decision.
199 Under interest analysis the court must identify the legitimate policy of the
state whose law is in question. This may or may not be the same as the real reason
why the law is as it is. See the discussion in B. CURRIu, supra note 3, at 143-44.
200 Id. at 144.
201 Whereas a rule-limiting the amount of damages recoverable in the case of
wrongful death, for example, would be said to represent a tort policy, it is applicable
to all defendants and is an attempt to allocate losses resulting from the commission of
a tort.




In terms of interest analysis, Grant is explained as a false conflict
on the ground that Arizona had no interest in the distribution of the
estate of a California decedent, who, it was assumed, left no property
to be administered in Arizona.20 3 But the reason why Arizona had no
interest relates to the policy behind its no-survival rule, a policy having
nothing to do with tort, but with the distribution of decedents' es-
tates. So, when the California court characterized the principal ques-
tion as one of decedents' estates, it was on functionally sound ground.
A judge committed to a policy-centered approach would identify the
problem area presented by this issue as one of decedents' estates, and the
state of primary reference would be the decedent's domicile, which is
the only state interested in giving him this kind of immunity.2 4 In
Grant that state was California, the forum, and under its law the
immunity was not given. Since the only state interested in immunizing
the defendant did not do so, he was not entitled to assert the defense.
Let me relate this approach somewhat further to the matter of
judicial method. In identifying the problem area as one of decedents'
estates, looking to the law of the decedent's domicile as the state of
primary reference, and concluding that if that state does not grant im-
munity the defense should not be recognized, the court has enunciated
a principle-the defense of immunity will not be recognized if im-
munity is not given under the law of the decedent's domicile-and has
also established a precedent to be applied in future cases. The applica-
tion of the precedent will mean that whenever the decedent is domi-
ciled in a non-immunity state, the cause of action will survive his
death. Under the precedent and its rationale the only relevant contact
point becomes the domicile of the decedent, and it does not matter
where the plaintiff was domiciled or where the accident occurred.20 5
The same result would obtain if suit had been brought in Ari-
zona. The Arizona court, identifying the problem area as one of dece-
dents' estates, would look to California as the state of primary reference
and see that California did not grant immunity. Since Arizona rather
than California was the forum, the Arizona court would have to con-
sider its own policy as well in order to determine whether it had any
interest in applying that policy to the particular case. The only contact
that Arizona had with the transaction was the fact that the accident
203 B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 144-46; D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 89.
204 This would be true even if he left property elsewhere, assuming that succession
to such property would be determined by the law of the domicile.
205 For a discussion of the development of a precedent with reference to the
relevant contact point see Sedler, supra note 6, at 116-17.
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occurred there. This would give rise to a "tort interest" on the part
of Arizona, but the issue has nothing to do with tort policy, and by
definition, Arizona would have no interest in applying its law to allow
the defense of immunity.2 6 The lack of interest on the part of Arizona
appears most clearly when the problem is properly identified as one
of decedents' estates rather than tort, and Grant, in my opinion,
demonstrates how the methodology proposed can assist the court in
reaching a sound result.
When the above analysis is applied to other "false conflict" cases
in the tort area, it will reveal that in most of these cases the issue on
which a conflict of laws existed was not a tort issue at all. Rather the
laws of the different states conflicted on the issue of a claim of im-
munity, and the policy behind the granting of immunity was not a
tort policy, but a policy directly antithetical to the tort policies of
compensation and deterrence. In this category I would put the cases
involving the defenses of family immunity, charitable immunity and
guest statutes, in other words, practically all of the leading "false con-
flict" cases. 207
Let us first consider family immunity.208 Since the basis for the
claim of immunity is the family relationship, the legally significant
fact-like the death of the tortfeasor in Grant-is that the parties to
the lawsuit are related to each other. This would suggest that the
policies to be furthered by the grant of immunity have something to
do with that relationship, and two quite different and inconsistent
"relationship justifications" have been advanced. The traditional justi-
fication was that to allow intra-family tort suits would disrupt family
harmony and embitter one family member against the other. This
justification might have some validity when applied to suits for the
commission of intentional torts (although it would seem that the filing
of the lawsuit would be good indication that family harmony was ir-
reparably damaged already), but, of course, this is not what the cases
involve. They involve automobile accidents in which one member of
the family is injured while the automobile is being operated by an-
other. Here the justification for barring the suits is not that family
harmony will be disrupted, but the family is "too harmonious" in
that they will collude against the liability insurer. 20 9 It is not necessary
206 See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
207 An exception to this pattern, involving policies that are clearly tort, is
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
208 This refers to immunity between spouses and between one family member and
another.
209 See the discussion in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 252-53, 163 A.2d 147, 150
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to debate at this juncture whether insurance considerations are or
are not a part of the law of torts.210 The point is that the reason for
allowing the defense relates to the fact that there is likely to be liability
insurance, and the defense is allowed to prevent collusion between the
family members against the insurer. This reason, like that of pre-
venting the disruption of family harmony, is directly antithetical to
the policies of compensation and deterrence expressed in the tort law
of any state.
Obviously the policy to be furthered by the defense of charitable
immunity is an anti-tort policy. Tort policies are sacrificed in order
to promote a charitable association policy that the assets of the
charity not be diverted to pay tort claims or the premiums on liability
insurance. The same is true of guest statutes. While the reason osten-
sibly advanced for the enactment of guest statutes is that they prevent
claims by ungrateful guests against their hosts-which could be
called a tort policy of allocating responsibility for accidents-it is
now recognized that the primary purpose of these statutes is to prevent
collusion between the host and the guest against the insurer.211 As with
the defense of family immunity, tort policies of compensation and
deterrence yield to the policy of protecting the insurer against collu-
sive suits.
To say that in these kinds of cases the problem area relates to
family law or insurance or charitable associations and not to "tort"
simply means that the policies to be implemented by the granting
of the immunity in question are not tort policies, but policies re-
lating to other areas of law. Once this is recognized the set created by
the concept tort will recede, and the relevant set will be that created
by the concept of family, insurance, charity, and the like. At a mini-
mum, the judge will not be unconsciously influenced toward the
application of the law of the place of injury because of the interest
of that state in applying its "tort law" to an accident occurring there.
More importantly, with identification of the problem area a conscious
and articulated process, once the court identifies the problem area in
(1960). When the marital domicile is a community property state, and the proceeds of
tort recovery belong to the community, this would furnish an additional basis for
spousal immunity, although, of course, not for immunity between other family members.
Thus, in Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), the California court con-
cluded that as a matter of California substantive law, intra-family immunity would be
abolished, although at that time spousal immunity was retained.
210 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 190, at 568-77.
211 Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of
Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 599-600
(1960).
1970]
RUTGERS e CAMDEN LAW JOURNAL
cases such as these it will look toward the state seemingly interested in
dealing with questions relating to the family, the charity and the in-
surance relationship. When the problem area is identified as one of
family law, the state of primary reference obviously would be the
family domicile. As to charitable associations, it would be the state or
states where the charity carried on its activities. In the case of auto-
mobile liability insurance this would be the state where the vehicle is
permanently kept, since such insurance is assigned and rates deter-
mined with reference to the residence of the insured. 21 2
Since the defenses of family immunity, charitable immunity and
guest relationship are grounded in policies other than those to be ad-
vanced by that area of law we call tort and are in fact directly anti-
thetical to those policies, the state of injury has no interest in granting
that kind of immunity. This issue does not involve a tort problem,
and the state of primary reference-the state having an interest in
granting the immunity claimed-is elsewhere. The law of that state
should be consulted first, and if immunity is not given by the law of
that state, there is no reason to allow the defense.
Many of the false conflict cases present a situation in which two
residents from a non-immunity state are involved in an accident in an
immunity state. In some of the earlier cases such as Haumschild v.
Continental Casualty Co.,213 and Emery v. Emery,214 in which forum
family members were involved in an accident in a state that recognized
family immunity, the court characterized the principal question as
one of family law and applied its own law to allow the suit.21 5 It may
have seemed that the courts in those cases were promulgating a new
rule based on a more realistic characterization of the principal ques-
tion, and this is the rule of the Restatement Second, namely that
family immunity is determined by the law of the family domicile.2 16
212 Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 567-69 (1961). It should be noted, as Professor Morris
demonstrates, that the existence of a guest statute as such, does not have actuarial
significance. Rates will be affected only by the incidence of guest-host claims, and if
there is a pattern of travel from a guest statute state into a non-guest statute state,
loss experience will reflect this fact. Id. at 574-77. See also A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39,
at 580-81.
213 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
214 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
215 For Professor Currie's view of such classification see B. CURRIE, supra note
3, at 641-43.
216 The original draft stated that the matter was determined by the law of the
domicile. The proposed official draft, however, qualifies this by saying that it is de-
termined by the law of the state of the most significant relationship, which will usually
be the state of the parties' domicile.
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While any "rule" as such must be rejected under a policy-centered ap-
proach, the premise of the "new rule" recognizes that the problem
area is not one of tort. The later "family immunity" cases have looked
to the marital domicile (which is also the forum) to allow the suit,
emphasizing that the policy considerations in such a case are those re-
lating to family relationships and liability insurance.2 17 In the com-
paratively rare case when suit is brought in the state of injury, that
court, recognizing that it has no interest in applying its immunity
policy solely on the ground that the accident occurred there, is likely
to look to the family domicile and allow the suit.2 1 8 The now classic
case of Babcock v. Jackson219 presented the situation of parties from
a non-immunity state being involved in an accident in a state recog-
nizing guest-host immunity. In such a situation courts that are com-
mitted to a policy-centered approach look to the law of the defendant's
residence, and since it does not provide immunity, refuse to allow the
defense, most times emphasizing that the primary purpose of a guest
statute is to protect the automobile liability insurer. 220
In Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels221 the New York court
applied the place of the wrong rule to deny recovery to a New York
plaintiff injured by a New York charitable association in Oregon,
which at that time retained charitable immunity. Presumably today
New York would apply its own law and reject the defense,222 but the
217 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Balts v. Baits, 273
Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439
(1963). It is only where the forum is committed to a traditional rules approach that
the law of the state of injury will be applied to deny recovery. See Landers v. Landers,
153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
218 See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
219 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
220 See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Kopp v. Rechtzigel,
273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 317, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222
A.2d 897 (1966); Woodward v. Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), cert. dismissed,
393 U.S. 957 (1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). Some
courts reach the same result under the state of the most significant relationship test.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969). Again, only a court committed
to the traditional rules approach will apply the law of the state of injury to deny recovery.
See White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). See also Fuller v. Greenup, 267 Cal.
App. 2d 10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ct. App. 1968), in which a disinterested third state looked
to the law of the parties' common residence to allow recovery.
221 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958), afl'd and modified mem., 5 N.Y.2d
1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959). The memorandum opinion of the Court
of Appeals allowed the immunity defense to stand without discussing the choice of law
question.
222 In Blum v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 1056, 244 N.Y.S.2d 351
(Sup. Ct. 1963), the court held that Babcock changed the rule of law upon which the
RUTGERS e CAMDEN LAW JOURNAL
decision in that case sheds light on the importance of proper identifica-
tion of the problem area. The court applied the "tort rule" automa-
tically because the case was one in which the plaintiff was suing to
recover damages for the commission of a tort. If it had focused on the
precise issue-should a charitable association be liable for its torts-it
might have avoided the "tort set" and considered alternatives to the
application of the "tort rule. '223
In a number of these cases the court, while refusing to apply the
law of the place of injury on the immunity issue, says that the law of
the state of injury should be applied on the "tort issues" of whether
the defendant's conduct was negligent and the like.224 There never ap-
pears, however, to be conflict of laws on these issues. As a practical
matter all states have the same general rules concerning negligence,
and it is only when one state has attempted to regulate the matter by
statute; e.g., when one state has a comparative negligence statute, that
a conflict may occur.225 This is all the more reason why the court must
precisely identify the problem area. Assuming that the law of the
place of injury would be applied on "tort" questions, applying the law
of another state on the immunity question merely represents the use
of the technique recognized in continental conflicts law that is called
d~paage.226 Depending on the policies and interests involved the laws
of different states may be chosen to govern different issues in the litiga-
tion,227 and the situations discussed above have been explained on this
basis. 228 Proper identification of the problem area, then, may enable
the court to apply the law of the state of injury on the "tort" issues229
without doing so on the issues that do not constitute "tort problems."
decision in Kaufman was based. On appeal the decision was affirmed on the ground
that Oregon no longer recognized charitable immunity. 21 App. Div. 2d 683, 250 N.YS.2d
522 (1964).
223 Thus, in Brown v. Church of Holy Name, - R.I. -, 252 A.2d 176 (1969),
in which a Rhode Island resident drowned while participating in an outing conducted
in Massachusetts by a Rhode Island church the defense of charitable immunity, which
was recognized by Massachusetts but not by Rhode Island, was disallowed. Professor
Ehrenzweig's "enterprise liability" approach arrives at the same conclusion, namely that
if a charity is not entitled to immunity under its own law, it should not be entitled to
claim immunity anywhere. A EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 583-84.
224 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 750 (1963); Woodward v. Stewart, - RI. -, -, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (1968); Thompson
v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 89, 193 A.2d 439, 441 (1963).
225 See Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
226 See generally Wilde, Ddpevage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L Rrv.
329 (1968).
227 Id. at 345-48.
228 Id. at 349-54, 356-62.
229 Of course, it still may decide that the law of the state of injury should not
apply on the tort question. See Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968). Where
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The failure to properly identify the problem area may explain the
confusion of the New York courts in the "guest statute cases" in which
New York parties are involved in an accident in a guest statute state.
In Babcock, the parties were on a week-end trip to Ontario and were
to return to New York. In Dym v. Gordon230 two New York students,
who had not known each other previously, met in Colorado and formed
the guest-host relationship there. The accident occurred on a trip
from one point in Colorado to another and involved a second vehicle.
In Macey v. Rozbicki 231 the parties were sisters who had a summer
home in Ontario. While they were staying there they decided to take
a brief trip, during which the one-car accident occurred. In Babcock
the court applied New York law on the issue of host-guest immunity
and allowed the suit. In Dym the court, seemingly adopting the "state
of the most significant relationship rule" of the Restatement Second,
and interpreting that rule with reference to factual contacts, applied
Colorado law to deny recovery. In Macey, however, the court found
that New York was the state of the most significant relationship. But
in all of these cases the plaintiffs and defendants were New Yorkers
temporarily out of the state, the automobiles were insured in New
York, and the recovery would have been met from the proceeds of the
insurance. 232
The court treated all of these cases as involving a tort question.
But if the primary reason for guest statutes today is to protect the
host's automobile liability insurer against collusive suits, then under
my approach the problem area should be identified as one of "insur-
ance," and the state of primary reference should be the state where the
automobile was insured. In these cases that would have been New
York, the forum. It is clear from a reading of Dym that the court was
not thinking in insurance terms, but in terms of tort, thereby creat-
ing a "tort set," which may have predisposed it to look to the law
of the state of injury. Since the factual contacts with that state were
great, perhaps the predisposition was enough to cause the court-
two parties from the same state are involved in an automobile accident in another state,
it is reasonable for their home state to conclude, on the basis of interest analysis, that
its law should apply in all respects. It is not necessary to pursue that question in the
context of the present writing.
230 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
231 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
232 In DuBois v. Siewert, 57 Misc. 2d 881, 293 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. 1968), the parties
were New York residents attending the same college in Ohio. They went to New York for
the weekend in the defendant's automobile, and the accident occurred in Ohio on the
return trip. The court decided that all the qualitative contacts were in New York, which
had the paramount interest.
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which did not want to be "provincial" 233- to come down in favor of
Colorado law. Whereas if the court, after its initial survey of the
problem, had treated it differently and operated with the set "auto-
mobile liability insurance," it may have been more disposed to apply
New York law. More importantly, if it had consciously considered the
policies behind the granting of immunity and precisely identified the
problem area as one of automobile liability insurance, under my ap-
proach, it would have looked to the state where the vehicle was per-
manently kept as the state of primary reference. This state was New
York, the forum, which also had a strong interest in applying its law
to allow recovery to its injured plaintiff. As will be demonstrated,
when the state of primary reference is the forum, the forum is not
likely to displace its law. It is submitted that if the court had identified
the problem as one of automobile liability insurance, it would have
recognized it as being indistinguishable from Babcock. The fact that
the court approached the solution of the problem with the "tort set"
may have influenced its decision if, as we contend, the tort set creates
a tendency, given our territorial bias, to look to the place of injury.
Dym may be complicated by another factor. It involved a two car
accident, and the majority of the court found an additional purpose
of the Colorado statute to be to give preference to the non-negligent
driver and his passengers over the passenger in the vehicle of the negli-
gent driver. Ignoring the fact that the driver of the other vehicle was
a resident of Kansas and that no other suits arising out of the accident
appeared to have been filed, the court properly could take the position
that Colorado, as the place of injury, did have an interest in having
its guest statute applied to implement its tort policy of creating a
preference in the allocation of the assets of the negligent driver. But
even if this were so, the most that could be said is that there was a
conflict of interests: New York's policy of protecting the injured pas-
senger and holding the host fully liable conflicts with Colorado's policy
of giving preference to the non-negligent driver and his passengers.234
The court resolved that conflict in favor of the policy of the state where
the accident occurred, and its resolution of the conflict in this manner
may also have been influenced by the "tort set" with which it ap-
proached the problem.2 3 5
In all three cases-Babcock, Dym and Macey-the plaintiffs and
233 16 N.Y.2d at 126, 209 N.E.2d at 795-96, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
234 Compare D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 293-312 with Sedler, supra note 6, at 74-77
concerning the Dym case.
235 See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), in
which the New York court applied its own tort policy in preference to the tort policy of
the state of injury.
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defendants in the litigation were New Yorkers, and the automobiles
were insured in New York, which has compulsory insurance.2 36 In all
cases recovery would have been from the proceeds of insurance taken
out on a New York vehicle for the benefit of an injured New York
plaintiff.23 7 It is difficult to see why the question of recovery for per-
sonal injuries suffered by a New York guest due to the negligence
of a New York host should have been decided differently in any of
these cases. Perhaps the answer may be that the court viewed the
problem as one of tort rather than automobile liability insurance
and that the tort set made it disposed to apply the law of the state
of injury in the one case having "greater" factual contacts with that
state.
That the problem involved is one of automobile liability insur-
ance was recently recognized by the New York Court of Appeals in
Tooker v. Lopez,23 in which the court effectively overruled Dym. There
the passenger and the driver were New York domiciliaries attending
college in Michigan. The vehicle was insured in New York. The acci-
dent occurred on a trip from the college to another point in Michigan,
which is a guest statute state. In a four to three decision the court
applied New York law on the issue of guest-host immunity.
The majority rejected the finding of the court in Dym that a
purpose of the Colorado guest statute was to assure priority in the
assets of the driver to the non-negligent third party, observing that
such a conclusion "overlooks not only the statutory history but the
fact that the statute permits recovery by guests who can establish that
the accident was due to the gross negligence of the driver. '23 9 Since
a guest could recover in those circumstances, the assurance of priority
could not be deemed to be a purpose of the statute. The court went on
to state:
The only justification for discrimination between injured guests
which can withstand logical as well as constitutional scrutiny ...
is that the legitimate purpose of the statute-prevention of fraud-
ulent claims against local insurers or the protection of local auto-
mobile owners-is furthered by increasing the guest's burden of
proof. This purpose can never be vindicated when the insurer is
a New York carrier and the defendant is sued in the courts of
this State. Under such circumstances, the jurisdiction enacting such
236 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWS §§ 310-21 (McKinney 1960).
237 Cases in which the guest would recover in excess of the policy limits should be
rather rare.
238 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
239 Id. at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
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a guest statute has absolutely no interest in the application of
its law.240
The court also noted that the New York compulsory insurance law
made no distinction between guests, pedestrians or other insured par-
ties. By treating the problem as one of automobile liability insurance
the New York court makes it clear that the state of injury can have no
interest in applying its immunity policy in favor of a non-resident
defendant and insurer.
In summary, when the defense asserted is one of immunity, under
my approach we would not identify the problem area as tort, but
would identify it with reference to the policy behind the granting of
immunity; i.e. as a problem of decedents' estates, charitable associations,
family law, automobile liability insurance, and the like. The state of
primary reference following such identification would be the state
seemingly having an interest in implementing such a policy; e.g., the
state of the decedent's domicile, the state where the charity carried on
its activities, 241 the state of the family domicile, the state where the au-
tomobile is insured. The law of that state would be consulted first, and
if it did not grant the immunity, the defense would not be recognized
since it is the only state having an interest in doing so.
We have thus far dealt only with the situation in which two
parties from a non-immunity state are involved in an accident in an
immunity state. Let us now consider the other fact-law patterns that
could arise in the immunity problem,
table. 242


















































that the charity carries on its activities
only in one state. Where it carries on its activities in more than one state, the law of
each state where it is acting would have to be consulted.
242 The table is borrowed from Professor Currie. B. CURME, supra note 3, at 84.
We will not be concerned with the possibility that the suit might be brought in a "dis-
interested third state."














We will assume that all courts have decided our example case as
suggested, and we will relate that fact to the matter of judicial method
in dealing with the cases set forth in the table. The example case
would be as follows:
Non-Immunity Non-Immunity Immunity Decided the
same way in
either forum
In the example case the court looked to the law of the defendant's
residence as the state of primary reference, because it was the only
state interested in granting the immunity claimed and held that if
immunity were not granted under the law of that state, the defense
would not be recognized. The precedent would be applicable in all
cases involving a defendant from a non-immunity state, in our table
cases three, four, five and six.2 44 By the same token it is clear that
the precedent alone will not provide the basis for decision in cases
one, two, seven, eight, nine and ten since these cases involve a defen-
dant from an immunity state. The approach taken in the example
case, however, may furnish a starting point, and some of the grounds
of decision may also be relevant here. What is certain is that a court
need not develop a rule that will be applied a priori to the solution
of all the cases, and as will be demonstrated, different courts may come
up with different decisions, equally defensible, depending upon their
analysis of their own interests and those of the other state and of what
will be a fair result between the parties.
Cases one and two are similar to the example case in that both par-
ties are residents of the same state and the accident occurred in another
state. But in terms of interest analysis there is an important difference.
When two residents from a non-immunity state are involved in an
accident in an immunity state a false conflict is presented because the
on its activities. The place where the defendant resides is the place where his vehicle
is insured.
244 In terms of interest analysis, cases No. 3 and 4 may be called the "unprovided
for case." The plantiff's home state and the state of injury would have an interest in
allowing him to recover, but their law is to the contrary. The defendant's home state
would have an interest in immunizing him, but its law is to the contrary. See the dis-
cussion in B. Cuiuua, supra note 3, at 152-53. In cases No. 5 and 6 the state of injury has
an interest in applying its law to allow the plaintiff injured there to recover. All states,
moreover, have a general policy of allowing injured plaintiffs to recover. In our ex-
amples the state of the plaintiff's residence makes an exception to this general policy in
order to implement non-tort policies that it considers to be more important. But since
that policy would be limited to its own defendants, it can have no objection to its plain-
tiff's recovering where the defendant's home state does not immunize him. See also
Sedler, supra note 6, at 115-17.
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state of injury has no interest in applying its immunity policy in favor
of a defendant whose home state does not immunize him. But when
two residents from an immunity state are involved in an accident in a
non-immunity state, the state of injury does have an interest in apply-
ing its own law for the benefit of the non-resident plaintiff. He may
have incurred medical and hospital expenses there, and resident cred-
itors may not receive payment unless he is able to obtain a tort re-
covery.245 Moreover, all states have an interest in providing recovery
for a person injured there as part of its policy of extending protection
to people who are within its borders.246 Thus in cases one and two
the immunity policy of the state of the defendant's residence conflicts
with the tort policy of the state of injury notwithstanding that the
plaintiff and defendant are residents of the same state.
Identifying the problem area as one of family law, insurance law
or the like causes the court, whether in the immunity or non-immunity
state, to look to the immunity state as the state of primary reference.
When the immunity state is the forum (case one), it is likely to apply
its own law. Freed from the "tort set" it will see its own immunity
policy in sharp focus. Its policy is to recognize such immunity in order
to implement policies applicable to the family, insurance, charitable
activities and the like, and it has a strong interest in doing so. More-
over, it would be the state primarily concerned with compensating the
injured plaintiff since the social consequences of his injury will be
felt there. But its law does not compensate him because other policies
have been deemed, usually by the legislature, to be more important.
The judgment on the proper balance of interests is equally applicable
when the accident occurs in another state, and if the forum protects
the defendant or the insurer or the charity in a domestic case, it will
do so in the foreign one as well. Notions of the "better rule" and
"principles of preference" are not persuasive to a court assessing the
interests of its own state in the application of its law and policy. Thus,
when two residents of an immunity state are involved in an accident
in a non-immunity state, and suit is brought "at home" (case one),
it may be expected that the forum will apply its own law and recog-
nize the defense.2 47
245 See the discussion in B. CURRIE, supra note 3. at 366.
246 See the discussion in D. CAvFRs, supra note 21, at 143-45.
247 See Wartell v. Formusa, 34 111. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966) (spousal); Wither-
spoon v. Salm, - Ind. App. -, 237 N.E.2d 116 (1968) rev'd on other grounds, - Ind.
-, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969) (guest statute); Fuerste v. Bemis, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 831
(1968) (same); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966) (spousal); Lederle v.
United Services Auto. Ass'n, 394 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (same). See also Mertz
[Vol. 2:8
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The more important question, as a practical matter, is what the
court of the non-immunity state will do if suit is brought there (case
two) since that court will have jurisdiction under its non-resident
motorist or non-resident tortfeasors act. The plaintiff, assuming that
the court of his home state would apply its law to allow the defense,
would bring suit in the state of injury hoping that it will decide to
apply its own law. Identifying the problem area as one of family law,
insurance law or the like will cause that court to look to the law of
the defendant's residence as the state of primary reference, and when
it does so it will see that under that law immunity is provided. The
crucial difference between traditional characterization and identifica-
tion of the problem area, however, is that no choice of law rule
follows from identification of the problem area. The law of the state
of primary reference is not necessarily applied. As we have pointed out,
when the forum is the state of primary reference it is likely to apply
its own law. But when it is not, the forum must consider its own
policies and interests and ask whether, in light of those policies and
interests and in fairness to the parties, its law should be displaced
and the law of the state of primary reference applied.
It is on this point that courts and commentators committed to a
policy-centered approach have differed.248 The analysis of the problem
that I have proposed leads to an apparent conflict between the family,
insurance, or charitable policies of the state of primary reference that
result in immunity, and the tort policy of the state of injury in pro-
viding compensation to those injured within its borders. The state of
injury may properly decide to apply its own law to further its tort
policies, which it believes to be sufficiently involved in the particular
case.249 Having identified the problem area raised by the precise issue
as one other than tort, and therefore, being free of the "tort set,"
v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936), in which the court achieved the same result
by holding that it was against its public policy to apply the law of the state of injury,
which allowed suits between spouses. It is only where the forum is committed to the
traditional rules approach and will not use the public policy escape hatch that it
will apply the law of the state of injury to allow the suit. See Friday v. Smoot, - Del.
-, 211 A.2d 594 (1965) (guest); Holder v. Holder, 384 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1962) (spousal);
Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964) (spousal). Compare DeFoor v. Le-
matta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968), in which the forum applied its tort policy
limiting recovery in a suit between two of its residents arising from an accident occurring
in a state that did not limit recovery.
248 For a discussion of differing views see Sedler, supra note 6, at 121-23.
249 As some courts have done. See Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968)
(spousal and guest statute); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968)
(guest statute); cf. Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 26
App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
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the court may evaluate those interests in a different light. This is what
was done by the New Hampshire court in Johnson v. Johnson,250
which involved an accident between Massachusetts spouses in New
Hampshire. Massachusetts recognizes spousal immunity; New Hamp-
shire does not. New Hampshire had previously decided our example
case and applied New Hampshire law to a suit between New Hamp-
shire spouses involved in an accident in Massachusetts. 251 Recognizing
the differences between the two situations, 252 and conceding a conflict
of interests between Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the court,
nonetheless, applied Massachusetts law on this issue. Its conclusion
was that the purposes of the relevant and applicable New Hampshire
laws would not be so seriously impaired by denying the Massachusetts
plaintiff the right to sue her husband in New Hampshire. 253 It also
pointed out that the vehicle was insured in Massachusetts and that
the application of New Hampshire law would expose the insurer to a
greater risk than it would have anticipated under Massachusetts law.254
What the court did was to recognize that it was dealing with an
insurance problem, and it made the insurance considerations disposi-
tive of the result. The response created by the "insurance set" is to look
to the state where the vehicle is insured, particularly when the plaintiff
is also a resident of that state. Realistically, the forum's interest in
allowing recovery by the injured out-of-state plaintiff is minimal. In
this day and age he will get back home and will not become a
public charge in the forum.255 It is also not functionally sound to
base a choice of law decision on the need to protect the recovery of
domestic medical creditors.256 It is true, of course, that the fact that
the plaintiff was injured there is constitutionally sufficient to justify
the forum's application of its own law.257 But that is not the end of
the matter. In a federal system it is vitally necessary that each state
recognize the interests of other states and try to accommodate those
250 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
251 Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
252 See the discussion notes 242-43 supra and accompanying text.
253 107 N.H. at 32, 216 A.2d at 783.
254 As a practical matter this is questionable. See the discussion in Morris, supra
note 212, at 574-77. The point is that Massachusetts is interested in applying its im-
munity policy to a Massachusetts insurance relationship.
255 Compare the situation existing at an earlier period with respect to injured work-
men who were temporarily present in the forum, as reflected in Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
256 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 6, at 124-25.
257 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
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interests, at least when its own are not significantly impaired thereby.258
While choice of law symmetry is not being advocated, it does seem that
when a court applies its own law to two of its residents involved in
an automobile accident in another state recognition and accommoda-
tion of state interests should require that it apply the law of the other
state when two residents of that state are involved in an automobile
accident in the forum. In Johnson the New Hampshire court was un-
willing to deny Massachusetts the same control over Massachusetts
residents involved in a New Hampshire accident that it claimed over
New Hampshire residents involved in a Massachusetts accident, and
so it displaced its own law on the issue of spousal immunity.
259
In such a case I believe that proper identification of the problem
area becomes very significant. By recognizing that the basis of the
claimed immunity relates to considerations of automobile liability in-
surance the court focuses its attention on the precise policies and
interests involved.2 60 It may then see its own interest in implementing
its tort policy in a very different light. At least it is articulating the
policies it sees to be involved and the premises on which it is pro-
ceeding. It will not be unconsciously influenced by a "tort set"
toward the application of the law of the place of injury. Of course,
it may conclude, after a careful analysis of policies and interests, that
its own interest is sufficiently involved so that its law should not be
displaced, and such a conclusion is defensible. The point is that it
must recognize what it is doing and why it is doing so. It must properly
evaluate the immunity policies of the state of the parties' common resi-
dence against its own tort policies. Having done so, if it decides to
prefer its own interest, it cannot be faulted.
By the same token, proper identification of the problem area may
demonstrate that even though the case involves a suit between family
members for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident,
the precise issue on which there is a conflict of laws may not involve
the kind of problem that would make the state of the family domicile
258 For a discussion of "The Task of Accommodating Conflicting State Laws" see
D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 120-24. This idea is also reflected in Professor Currie's "more
moderate and restrained interpretation" approach. See the discussion in B. CuRRIE, supra
note 3, at 186.
259 See also Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 486, 157 N.W.2d 579, 588 (1968)
(dissenting opinion by Hallow, C.J.); cf. the discussion in D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at
177-80.
260 Professor Ehrenzweig's position is that the "true rule" in all cases involving tort
liability is based upon considerations of insurability. See generally. A. EHENzWEiG supra
note 39, at 568-93.
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the state of primary reference. Suppose that spouses from an immunity
state are involved in a two-car accident in a non-immunity state. The
driver of the other vehicle is a resident of the non-immunity state.
He is sued by the injured wife, and he seeks to join the admittedly-
negligent husband as a third party defendant in order to obtain con-
tribution from him. Joinder is permitted under the law of the state
of injury, but would not be permitted under the law of the spouses'
home state, since one spouse is substantively excused from liability to
the other. Here the issue involves considerations relating to how losses
should be distributed among parties responsible for an accident and the
policies to be implemented by that area of law we call "tort." There is
a conflict between the interest of the state of the spouses' residence in
immunizing its resident and insurer and the interest of the state of
injury in allowing contribution to its resident and its insurer, but it
is a conflict due to conflicting tort policies relating to allocation of
accident losses. Identifying the problem area in this way may cause the
court to look to the state of injury as the state of primary reference,
and when that state is the forum, it may be expected that it will
apply its own law and allow joinder.261 But if that court carelessly
identifies the problem area as one of family law or the like, it may
automatically apply the law of the state of domicile without consider-
ing its own interest in implementing its tort policies, and this has,
in fact, happened.26 2 Precise identification of the problem area prevents
either the automatic application of the law of the state of injury or
the state of the parties' common residence, and will cause the court
to focus on the policies and interests involved in each issue on which
there is a conflict of laws.
Cases seven and eight present the clearest examples of a true con-
flict of interests. The state of injury has a strong interest in applying
its tort policy of allowing recovery in favor of its resident who was
injured there. But the state of the defendant's residence has the same
interests in applying its immunity policy irrespective of where the
261 See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968);
Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967); cf. LaChance v. Service Truck-
ing Co., 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963). In Urhammer v. Olson, 39 Wis. 2d 447, 159
N.W.2d 688 (1968), a Minnesota wife brought suit against a Wisconsin defendant and his
insurer to recover damages arising out of an accident in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin de-
fendant impleaded the plaintiff's husband and the husband's insurer. (Wisconsin permits
a direct action against the insurer.) The insurance policy contained a family exclusion
dause, which was valid under the law of Minnesota, a family immunity state, but not
under Wisconsin law. The court treated this as an insurance question rather than
one of "tort," and applying Minnesota law, sustained the defense.
262 Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
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accident occurred and where the injured plaintiff resided. The interests
conflict, and the conflict cannot be avoided by a "more moderate and
restrained interpretation of the policies or interests of one of the
states. "263 When suit is brought in the state of injury (case seven) the
forum, although identifying the problem area as one of insurance,
family law, etc., and first looking to the state of the defendant's resi-
dence, would see that the immunity policy of that state conflicted with
its tort policy of allowing recovery. Since its own resident was injured
within its borders it cannot help but decide to prefer its tort policy,
and it is certainly not unfair to subject the defendant and his insurer
to the forum's law when he caused the injury there.2 64 The same rea-
soning would dictate that if suit were brought in the immunity state
(case eight), that state would apply its own law, but this case will not
arise since the plaintiff will bring suit in his home state, obtaining
jurisdiction under the non-resident motorist or non-resident tortfeasors
act.
In the above situation the tort policy of the state of injury con-
flicted with the immunity policy of the defendant's home state, and
the interest of the state of injury in implementing that policy was such
that it clearly would be expected to prefer that interest. The tort policy
of the state of injury would also be significant when it conflicted with
the immunity policy of the defendant's home state in a suit involving
an intentional tort. Suppose we are in New Hampshire, which, as we
saw, applied the law of the marital domicile in a suit between two Mas-
sachusetts spouses involved in an automobile accident in New Hamp-
shire. The same spouses come back to New Hampshire, except that
this time the husband beats the wife unmercifully, throws her uncon-
scious form into the automobile and returns at break-neck speed to
Massachusetts. The wife then brings suit in New Hampshire to recover
for her injuries, obtaining jurisdiction under the non-resident tort-
feasors act. The husband asserts the defense of spousal immunity. The
New Hampshire court would recognize that here the problem area is
truly one of family law and that the policy behind the Massachusetts
rule of spousal immunity would be to maintain family harmony
(whether this is a sound or realistic policy is for Massachusetts to
decide). Although the New Hampshire court, following its identifica-
tion of the problem area, would first look to Massachusetts law, it is,
of course, not bound to apply it.265 Looking to its own policy and in-
263 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 6, at 118.
264 Id. at 119-20.
265 Cf. REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) § 169.
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terest it would see that what is involved is an admonitory tort-it is
obviously trying to deter such conduct by allowing civil recovery, in-
cluding punitive damages' 6 6 -and the strong interests of the place
of acting in applying its law to govern admonitory torts cannot be
doubted.267 It would be expected that New Hampshire would apply its
own law here, and the result is in no way inconsistent with New Hamp-
shire's decision to apply Massachusetts law in the automobile accident
case. In that case New Hampshire did not see its tort policy as being
significant; here, since an admonitory tort is involved, it is, and New
Hampshire would prefer its own policy.
Cases nine and ten, in terms of interest analysis, also involve a
true conflict. The immunity state is interested in immunizing its defen-
dant who acted there; the non-immunity state is interested in compen-
sating its plaintiff notwithstanding that the injury occurred elsewhere.
If each state followed the rationale of cases seven and eight, it should
apply its own law. Of course, case ten could only arise if defendant
were personally served in the non-immunity state. Let us assume that he
is. Since the injury occurred in the immunity state and defendant is
a resident of that state, despite the interest of the non-immunity state
in applying its own law, there is a question of whether it could consti-
tutionally do so. This much of the territorial principle seemingly re-
mains, that a state may not apply its law solely on the ground that the
plaintiff is a resident of that state. If defendant did nothing in forum,
the causing of an injury to the forum's resident in another state would
not be a sufficient constitutional contact to justify the forum's applying
its own law.268
Suppose, however, that defendant had by pre-arrangement
come into the forum to take plaintiff to his home state and was to
take him back to the forum. Although the accident occurred elsewhere,
it would now seem that the forum has sufficient factual contacts to
enable it to apply its own law, and in view of its interest, it is likely
to do so. 269 This example indicates that it is not always possible to neatly
266 "Since battery usually is a matter of the worst kind of intentions, it is a tort
which frequently justifies punitive damages." W. PROSSER, supra note 190, at 34.
267 See generally Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts,
36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951).
268 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 6, at 127-28.
269 See Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968), where this
result was reached. In Abendschein v. Farrell, 11 Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968),
the plaintiffs were New York residents and the defendant was a resident of Michigan.
The trip originated in New York, and the accident occured in Ontario, while the parties
were en route to Michigan. Ontario and Michigan had guest statutes; New York did not.
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categorize fact-law patterns, and for this reason it is important to re-
member that the court is only making a decision concerning what law
should be applied in the fact-law pattern of the particular case.
If we may summarize this important aspect of "tort-something"
identification of the problem area, the immunity that a defendant in
a tort suit asserts will usually involve non-tort or anti-tort policies
and considerations-the preservation of family harmony, the pre-
vention of collusive suits against an insurer, the protection of the assets
of a charitable association or a decedent's estate. Once the court identi-
fies the problem area in this way it will look first to the state seemingly
having an interest in providing such immunity, which we call the state
of primary reference. If that state does not give the immunity claimed,
there is no reason for any other state to do so, and the defense of im-
munity should be rejected. This principle covers the example case and
and cases three, four, five and six. When the defendant who has com-
mitted the tort in a non-immunity state is a resident of an immunity
state, his home state, the state of primary reference on the issue of im-
munity, may be expected to apply its own law if suit is brought there
(cases one, eight and nine)2 70 However, if this is to be expected, the
plaintiff is likely to bring suit in the non-immunity state, where juris-
diction will exist (in case 2 and 7) under the non-resident motorist or
non-resident tort feasors act. When the plaintiff is a resident of the
non-immunity state (case seven) it will certainly reject the defense,
concluding that the compensatory policy reflected in its tort law should
If suit had been brought in New York, the New York court would be expected to apply
its own law. Suit, however, was brought in Michigan (so that this becomes case No. 9).
The majority took the position that New York law should govern as the state of the
most significant relationship, but felt compelled to apply the law of the state of injury
The dissenting judge took the position that the court was free to depart from the state
of injury rule. His view on whether New York or Michigan law should apply was that
this depended on whether the legislature intended that the statute was to be applicable
extraterritorially. If so, he believed that Michigan should apply its own law. The issue
was rendered moot when the supreme court continued its adherence to the place of the
wrong rule. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
270 In a situation such as this a court is likely to follow Professor Currie's view that
it cannot and should not balance competing state interests. See B. CURRIE, supra note 3,
at 181-82. Nor is the court of the immunity state likely to be persuaded that it should
displace its law because the law of the other state represents the better rule. See the
discussion in Fuerste v. Bemis, - Iowa -, -, 156 N.W.2d 831, 834-35 (1968). When
courts have talked in terms of the better rule, as in Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d
468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968), coincidentally the better rule has been its own. See also
Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968), in which a federal court
in Wisconsin assumed that the Wisconsin courts would not refuse to apply that state's
limitation on damages recoverable for wrongful death in favor of a Wisconsin defendant
against an Ohio plaintiff on the ground that Ohio's no limitation rule was the better rule.
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prevail over the immunity policy of the other state. When the plaintiff
is a resident of the immunity state (case two) the non-immunity forum
will have to decide whether its compensatory policy is sufficiently in-
volved that it should refuse to recognize the immunity policy of the
state of the parties' common residence. From the standpoint of judicial
method and the policy-centered conflict of laws, it does not matter how
the court resolves that question. So long as it focuses on the precise
policies and interests involved, it has made a valid decision.
A court approaching conflicts questions in this way can also dis-
tinguish between the automobile accident case and the case involving
an admonitory tort, and between a "tort problem" such as contribution
from a spousal defendant and the problem of immunity between the
spouses inter se. Each case can be decided with reference to the fact-
law pattern presented and in light of considerations of policy and fair-
ness to the parties. By focusing on the precise problem area involved
the court will avoid the "tort set" and will not be unconsciously in-
fluenced toward automatically applying the law of the state of injury
to a non-tort problem.
We may now consider some other aspects of "tort-something"
identification, and in these situations the identification of the problem
area may well be determinative of the result on the choice of law issue.
Suppose that Ontario spouses are involved in a two-car automobile
accident in California, and the injured wife brings suit in California
against the driver of the other vehicle. It is admitted that the husband
was negligent in the operation of his vehicle. Under California law the
negligence of the husband is imputed to the wife in a suit against the
third party; that is not so under Ontario law. On the surface the issue
of imputed negligence would seem to pose a tort question: is the pas-
senger barred from recovery against a third party because of the driver's
negligence? When the policy behind the California rule is considered,
however, it is clear that this policy is not one of tort but a policy
relating to the fact that California is a community property state. Under
California law as it existed at the time of Bruton v. Villoria,271 in which
this problem was presented, the proceeds of a recovery for personal in-
juries suffered by the wife would belong to the community. This being
so, as the court observed: "The sole reason for the rule which imputes
the negligence to the wife in cases such as the one at bar is that the hus-
band, having a community interest in the recovery, should not be per-
mitted to benefit from his own wrong. '272 The court also pointed out
271 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
272 Id. at 644, 292 P.2d at 640.
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that the rule was not applicable when the proceeds would not be com-
munity property, such as when the parties were not married at the
time of the accident or the husband had subsequently died. Having
identified the problem area as one of community property, it looked
to the marital domicile, Ontario (which under the approach we are
suggesting would be the state of primary reference), and saw that under
Ontario law the husband's negligence was not imputed. There was
obviously no countervailing policy of California requiring imputation
-since the reason for the California rule had nothing to do with its
tort policy2 3-and the defense was rejected. A realistic identification of
the problem area was determinative of the result, and the court did
not automatically apply the law of the state of injury to a "seemingly
tort question" that did not involve tort policies at all.
The converse of this situation was presented in Choate v. Ran-
som, 274 in which Idaho spouses were involved in a two-car accident in
Nevada. Idaho was a community property state, and under Idaho law
the proceeds of the wife's recovery would belong to the community.
Nevada was also a community property state, but under Nevada law
the proceeds would not be community property, and so spousal negli-
gence was not imputed. Identifying the problem area as one of com-
munity property the Nevada court looked to Idaho law to determine
the issue, observing that, "Whether contributory negligence is or is not
imputable must, then, depend in each case upon the nature of the re-
covery as community or separate property." 275 The court did not con-
sider whether it had any interest in applying its tort policy of com-
pensating accident victims there, in all probability because of the rather
clear "community property set" with which it approached the question.
Since Idaho spouses were involved, and Idaho did not want the husband
to "profit by his own wrong," Nevada would respect Idaho's policy on
what it considered to be a community property problem.27 6
273 Whereas a rule to the effect that the contributory negligence of the driver
would be imputed to the passenger in all cases would reflect a tort policy, e.g., the pas-
senger has a responsibility for his own safety, which is implemented by imputing the
driver's contributory negligence to him.
274 74 Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958).
275 Id. at 104, 323 P.2d at 702.
276 Commentators tend to disagree with the result in Choate. Professor Ehrenzweig
contends that the basic law of the forum should not be displaced "in favor of the
obsolescent imputation rule prevailing elsewhere." A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at
652-53. Professor Hancock argues that the state of injury should apply its own law,
refusing to impute contributory negligence, and at the same time apply its law holding
that the proceeds are the wife's separate property. Hancock, Three Approaches to the
Choice-of-Law Problem: The Classificatory, The Functional and the Result-Selecting, in
XXTH CENTURY" 365, 374-78. But this is not what the marital domicile wants. It wants
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The "tort-something" identification has also been result-determina-
tive in suits by an employee, who is covered by workmen's compensa-
tion, against a third party tortfeasor. Although the employee's common
law action against his immediate employer is generally abolished, a
number of states still allow the common law action against a third party
tortfeasor. The conflicts problem arises when the employment relation-
ship and the accident are connected with different states, the laws of
which differ on the question of a common law action against a third
party tortfeasor. In Wilson v. Faul1277 the plaintiff, whose immediate
employer was the sub-contractor, brought suit against the general con-
tractor for injuries caused by the negligent erection of a scaffold.
Plaintiff was a resident of New Jersey, and his employer carried work-
men's compensation insurance for his benefit under the New Jersey act.
Defendant was repairing a building in Pennsylvania and had sub-
contracted with the plaintiff's employer for part of the repairs.
Plaintiff, who had been hired by his employer in New Jersey, was sent
to do the sub-contracting job in Pennsylvania, where the accident oc-
curred. Defendant carried workmen's compensation insurance cov-
ering the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania act. After the accident
plaintiff obtained workmen's compensation from his employer in New
Jersey, and then instituted the common law action in New Jersey, where
defendant resided. The laws of Pennsylvania and New Jersey dif-
fered on the liability of the general contractor to employees of the sub-
contractor. Under Pennsylvania law the general contractor had to take
out workmen's compensation for employees of the sub-contractor but
was immune from a common law action. Under New Jersey law the
general contractor did not incur workmen's compensation liability to
employees of a sub-contractor when, as here, the sub-contractor had
taken out workmen's compensation insurance for them, but the gen-
eral contractor was liable in a common law action.
The New Jersey court refused to allow the suit. It specifically
stated that it would not base its decision on characterization, that is,
it would not make the choice of law on the basis of tort, contract,
or employment relation conflict of laws principles. 278 Certainly it did
the recovery to be treated as community property (for what it considers valid family
purposes), and for this reason wants negligence to be imputed. If the state of injury sees
no real interest in implementing its tort policy (if it does, it will apply its own law),
it should respect the community property policy of the parties' home state. See also
Reeves v. Schulmeier, 303 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), where spouses from a noncommunity
jurisdiction were involved in an accident in a community state. It was held that the rule
of the state of injury requiring spousal joinder was inapplicable, since the reason for the
rule was that the proceeds of the recovery belonged to the community.
277 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
278 Id. at 115-16, 141 A.2d at 774.
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not engage in analytical characterization to determine whether the
principal question was one of tort, workmen's compensation or
the like and then apply a particular choice of law "rule." But, it is
submitted, the court did identify the problem area as one of workmen's
compensation and based its decision on what may be called workmen's
compensation policies. In so doing, it looked to the law of the state
where the defendant carried workmen's compensation insurance for the
plaintiff's benefit, which was Pennsylvania. Throughout the opin-
ion it talked in terms of workmen's compensation policies, such as the
need to provide a prompt and practical compensation remedy for an
injured employee. The court concluded that "the person who provides
that compensation in an interested state has a definite liability which is
predictable with some degree of accuracy and is granted an immunity
from an employee's suit for damages which does not disappear when-
ever his enterprise chances to cross state lines and the suit is brought
in another state." 279
While the court did not characterize, it did identify. It identi-
fied the problem area as one of workmen's compensation-emphasizing
the policies applicable to that area of law-and looked to the state
where the defendant had taken out workmen's compensation insurance
for the plaintiff's benefit as the state of primary reference. It saw that
that state immunized the employer from a common law action and did
not find countervailing New Jersey policies sufficiently strong to justify
the refusal to apply that law. Although New Jersey would allow greater
recovery against a general contractor under the circumstances than did
Pennsylvania, the fact remains that the plaintiff did recover workmen's
compensation and presumably his subsistence needs would be met.
More importantly, the court was also concerned with fairness to the
defendant, and since he had taken out workmen's compensation insur-
ance for the plaintiff's benefit in Pennsylvania, he was entitled to rely
on Pennsylvania law to give him immunity from a common law action.
In the view of the New Jersey court, the application of Pennsylvania
law
reflects the basic philosophy underlying the adoption of workmen's
compensation acts by the several states as the exclusive remedy for
industrial accidents, and the reasoning applies with equal force
when an injured employee of a subcontractor brings a common law
negligence action in the state of contract or employment relation
against a general contractor, who under the compensation law of
the state of injury is substituted for the immediate employer for
compensation purposes.280
279 Id. at 124, 141 A.2d at 779.
280 Id. at 119-21, 141 A.2d at 774-78. See Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 262 Cal.
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In Elston v. Industrial Life Co., 281 Pennsylvania "returned the com-
pliment." A Pennsylvania resident working in New Jersey was injured
there while operating a fork-lift truck purchased from a Pennsylvania
corporation. He obtained workmen's compensation benefits from his
employer under the New Jersey act, and then brought suit against the
manufacturer, which was permitted under New Jersey law. Suit was
brought in Pennsylvania, 28 2 and the manufacturer sought to join the
employer as a third party defendant. This was not permitted by New
Jersey law, but Pennsylvania allowed joinder of an employer who had
paid workmen's compensation, limiting his liability for contribution
to the extent of his liability for workmen's compensation. Thus, Penn-
sylvania's tort policy of allocating losses between joint tortfeasors was
to allow limited contribution against the employer, and it had an inter-
est in applying that policy in favor of a Pennsylvania manufacturer
sought to be held liable for a defective product manufactured and sold
there.
It also treated the problem area as one of workmen's compensation
and looked to the law of the state where the employer carried com-
pensation for the employee's benefit, here New Jersey. In deferring
to that state's interest the court stated:
In the instant case, however, Industrial seeks to have the
Pennsylvania rule, one reflecting an accommodation developed to
meet the needs of our workmen's compensation programs, inter-
jected into litigation arising out of a New Jersey work-injury. Were
Industrial to prevail, the Pennsylvania policy of permitting con-
tribution would be imposed upon the New Jersey program of
workmen's compensation. Pennsylvania, thus, would interject a
limitation on the manner by which New Jersey could determine
to meet the social costs of its industrial accidents. Such an approach,
in our view, would be unsound. The extent to which the New
Jersey program of workmen's compensation should assimilate the
equities underlying contribution is a determination more ap-
propriately to be made by that state.283
App. 2d 741, 69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Ct. App. 1968); cf. Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 289
F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968), where the employer elected not to come under the Oregon
statute. Under Oregon law this meant that a common law action could be maintained.
The employee worked in both Oregon and Idaho, and the injury occurred in Idaho.
The employer was covered under the Idaho act, and the employee received benefits
there. In this situation the court held that Oregon law was applicable and allowed the
suit.
281 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966).
282 Since the employee was not covered under the Pennsylvania act, his suit against
the manufacturer in Pennsylvania would be treated as an ordinary tort action. If New
Jersey law had prohibited such a suit, a different question would have been presented.
283 420 Pa. at 108, 216 A.2d at 324.
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Although in the above cases the injury also occurred in the state whose
law was applied, the basis of the reference to that state was the fact that
it was there that the defendant had taken out workmen's compensation
insurance for the benefit of the injured workman. When the problem
area is identified in this manner, the law of that state would apply, even
though the injury may have occurred in another state.284 In these cases
the courts have uniformly identified the problem area as one of work-
men's compensation and have looked to the law of the state where the
defendant has taken out workmen's compensation insurance covering
the particular plaintiff.285 It is precisely because they have identified the
problem area in this way that they have strived to implement the pol-
icies reflected in the workmen's compensation law of that state and have
not found countervailing considerations justifying the application of
the law of another state, including their own.
A final aspect of "tort-something" identification is the matter of
tort or contract. Under the traditional approach this area provided
extensive opportunity for what has been called "disingenuous charac-
terization"; 2 6 that is, the court, in order to avoid the application of
the place of the wrong rule, would characterize the principal ques-
tion as one of contract so as to apply the law of the forum under the
guise of the "place of contracting" rule. The classic example is Levy v.
Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co.,2s7 in which a Connecticut auto-
rental agency rented an automobile to a Connecticut driver, who was
involved in an accident in Massachusetts in which his Connecticut pas-
senger was injured.288 Under Connecticut law the lessor of an automo-
bile was vicariously liable for the harm caused by the lessee; this was
not so under Massachusetts law. Since the tort occurred in Massachu-
setts and since the Connecticut court did not question-and still does
not2 8-- the rule that "matters of tort are governed by the law of the
place of the wrong," it needed another way to bring about the applica-
284 See Tab Constr. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 83 Nev. 364, 432 P.2d 90
(1967); Hudnall v. S. & W. Constr. Co., 451 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).
285 In Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 289 F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968), the defendant
had the option of taking out workmen's compensation for the plaintiff under the Oregon
law or being subject to a common law tort action. He did not have this option under
Idaho law. Since the bulk of the plaintiff's work was done in Oregon, there was no un-
fairness in subjecting him to what was, in effect, the Oregon workmen's compensation rule.
286 B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 181.
287 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). See B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 181; D. CAVERS,
supra note 21, at 173 n. 50; A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 313.
288 It is interesting to note that the residence of the plaintiff is nowhere discussed
in the opinion. It appears, however, that it was Connecticut.
289 See Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966).
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tion of Connecticut law, which it apparently wanted to do. By charac-
terizing the principal question as one of "contract," it could apply
Connecticut law as the law of the place where the contract was made.
This it did, holding that as a matter of law, the injured party was the
third party beneficiary of the contract between the lessor and the lessee.
The result obviously is a very sound one. The case presents a false
conflict since Massachusetts had no interest in applying its law to deny
recovery to a Connecticut victim against a Connecticut auto-rental
agency, which was cognizant of Connecticut law, and which, if it had
insured against liability, would have insured with reference to the
Connecticut requirement. 290 If the court had been committed to a
policy-centered approach, it would have found no difficulty in holding
that the statute, reflecting tort policies of compensation and deter-
rence,291 was applicable to the accident occurring in Massachusetts. 292
Clearly the problem area presented by such a case has nothing to do
with contractual policies. It relates to vicarious liability for the com-
mission of a tort, and if anything, would inhibit contractual relation-
ships.
The "tort-contract" question has also been involved in suits against
carriers for personal injuries arising under a "contract of carriage."
Under the traditional approach the contract characterization, of course,
would result in the application of the law of the place where the con-
tract was entered into rather than the law of the place where the injury
occurred. In the early case of Dyke v. Erie R.R., 293 the New York court
used this device to avoid the application of the law of the state of injury,
which limited the amount recoverable against the carrier. In more re-
cent times the New York courts and others, however, have been unwill-
ing to treat such a suit as presenting a "contract" problem.2 94 But they
290 For a discussion of the case from this aspect see A. _HRENZWEIG, supra note 39,
at 575-77.
291 Probably at this time the court was more concerned with the admonitory feature
of the statute than with shifting the loss to a responsible enterprise. The Connecticut
rental agency that was careless in renting automobiles might rent one to a driver
who could cause an accident in Connecticut.
292 See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (dram
shop act). In Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 138 A.2d 705 (1958), the court applied Con-
necticut law on a contract theory, although the lease agreement was entered into in
Pennsylvania. The court found that the contract was intended to have its beneficial
effect in Connecticut. Apparently the plaintiff was a Connecticut resident; the defendant
was a Connecticut resident, although it was claimed he was still domiciled in Rhode
Island. The factual contacts of the transaction with Connecticut justified the application
of Connecticut's tort policy.
293 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
294 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.
2d 133 (1961); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A2d 796 (1964).
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have achieved the same result as was achieved in Dyke by declining to
apply the limitation of the state of injury in a suit by a resident pas-
senger against a carrier when the trip originated in the forum.2 95 Again
the court is dealing with a tort problem involving tort policies, not-
withstanding that the parties have entered into a contractual rela-
tionship out of which the injuries in question occurred. Tort-contract
identification does not seem to present any significant questions today
and will not be relevant in the application of the policy-centered
approach. 29 6
In this part of the writing a number of situations presented in
suits arising out of the commission of a tort when the conflicts issue,
functionally analyzed, involved policies other than those sought to be
implemented by that area of law we call tort have been analyzed. Recog-
nition of this factor may promote the avoidance of the "tort set" (and
the tendency, conscious or unconscious, toward the application of the
law of the place where the injury occurred) and result in a more realistic
appraisal of the precise policies and interests involved. The matter of
proper identification of the problem area in these cases seems crucial
to an understanding of why in many of them the law of the place of
injury should not be applied. The reason that the law of the place of
injury should not be applied is that with respect to the particular issue
on which a conflict exists no tort policies (that the state of injury
would admittedly be interested in implementing) are involved, or the
non-tort policies of another state are such that they demonstrate clearly
295 In Kilberg the court held it was against New York's public policy to apply
the limitation. Since the New York wrongful death statute was not applicable extra-
territorially, what the court did in effect, was to look to Massachusetts law to determine
liability and to New York law to determine damages. See the discussion in Sedler, supra
note 6, at 130-32; Wilde, supra note 226, at 349. Subsequently, the New York court has
held that its wrongful death statute is applicable extraterritorially. Farber v. Smolack,
20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967). In Griffith the court applied
Pennsylvania law as the state of the most significant relationship.
296 The contract approach is still utilized in cases involving provisions in a
transportation ticket limiting the time in which suit can be brought. Usually the ticket
contains an express choice of law provision, which the court will uphold when the
plaintiff could be found to have had actual notice of it. Compare Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955) with Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp.
465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In the absence of an express choice of law provision, the courts look
to the state of the most significant relationship to determine the validity of the limita-
tion provision. See Piscane v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 219 F.Supp. 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). In this country the matter is controlled by federal law, which voids
limitation periods of less than one year. See Schwartz v. S.S. Nassau, 345 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.
1965). As a matter of federal substantive law the limitation is ineffective unless the ticket
impressed the importance of the terms and conditions upon the passenger. See Silvestri
v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968). As a practical
matter, the question is whether the parties can impose conditions on the enforcement of
a tort claim by agreement, and the courts have not lost sight of the tort policies involved.
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that the interest of that state is paramount and the interest of the state
of injury minimal. From the standpoint of identification of the problem
area, as that process has been developed, it is evident that many of the
leading tort conflicts cases are really not tort cases at all.
B. Contract-something
Here the situation in which a party seeks to avoid liability on a
contract into which he has admittedly entered will first be considered.
The grounds of avoidance, however, involve policies unrelated to the
purposes of that body of law we call contract and in fact, are directly
antithetical to those purposes, namely, the protection of a class of per-
sons who, in the opinion of the legislature of their home states, need to
be protected from entering into certain or all contractual obligations.
If a court approaches the question with a "contract set," it thinks in
terms of those policies associated with contracts-insuring security of
transactions, giving effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties,
promoting the flow of commerce-and it will be looking to the state
the law of which should be applied to regulate the "contract" aspect of
the case. Irrespective of whether it follows the place of contracting rule
of the original Restatement 297 or the localizing approach of the Restate-
ment Second 298 or a rule of validation,299 its concern will be with
contract policies rather than with the protective policies reflected in the
law of the state that allows one party to avoid the contract in question.
If the law of the state affording protection is ever applied, it will be
only because it comes out to be the state chosen by the contract rule.
Once it is recognized, however, that the reason for the immunity
that is claimed has nothing to do with contract policies, but is based
on policies of an entirely different and anti-contractual nature-the
precise label or area of law we assign to these policies is not important
-the court is free from the "contract set." Identifying the problem area
as one of immunity causes the court to look to the state seemingly inter-
ested in granting such immunity, and this will be the state of the party's
residence, where the adverse effects of enforcing the contract against
him will be felt. The same situation as in the tort-immunity cases is
presented, and the same conclusions are applicable. If that state does
not grant the immunity claimed, there is no reason for any other
297 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1934). When the contract was to be
performed in another state, the law of that state governed questions relating to the
details and sufficiency of performance. Id. § 358.
298 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 188.
299 See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 465-90.
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state to do so, and the claim of immunity should be rejected. 300 When
the law of that state does provide immunity and the state interested in
regulating the contract does not, there is a conflict between the im-
munity policies of the state of residence and the contract policies of the
contract state. 301 How the courts may resolve this conflict will be dis-
cussed shortly. But by focusing on the non-contract, or more accurately,
anti-contract policies involved in the claim of immunity; that is, by
precisely identifying the problem area, the court will avoid the "contract
set" and will not be unconsciously influenced toward the automatic
application of the law of the "contract" state.
This situation is illustrated by the classic case of Milliken v.
Pratt o30 2 in which a Maine creditor brought suit in Massachusetts
against a Massachusetts wife who had become surety for an obligation
of her husband. As Massachusetts law stood at the time of the trans-
action,303 a wife could not bind herself as surety for her husband; Maine
law was to the contrary. The court concluded that Maine law governed
the contract and rejected the defense. Professor Currie has used this
case and the problem of married women's contracts to develop his ap-
proach of interest analysis,30 4 and for him this case clearly presents a
true conflict. Maine's policy was to protect the creditor, and it had an
interest in protecting a Maine creditor who entered into a contract in
Maine.305 Massachusett's policy was to protect its married women
against overreaching by their husbands,30 6 and it had an interest in
implementing its policy whenever a Massachusetts married woman was
involved, although she may have entered into the contract in another
state. Since there was a true conflict, he would say that the forum, Massa-
chusetts, should prefer its own interests and apply its own law.30 7
Professor Ehrenzweig, on the other hand, argues that "the state of
the woman's domicile need not, and indeed should not extend its pro-
tection to foreign transactions at the expense of unwary citizens of
300 In terms of interest analysis there is a false conflict, since the state interested in
granting immunity does not do so, and no other state has an interest in immunizing
him.
301 We will assume that all the significant contractual facts occurred in a single
state. When this is not so, the contract state is the state whose law would apply under
the forum's view of the applicable law in contract cases.
802 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
303 At the time of the suit the restriction had been removed. As a practical matter
this factor may have influenced the decision.
804 B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at ch. 2.
305 For the reason that this was considered a Maine contract see the discussion in
Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IOWA L. Rv. 399, 402 (1968).
306 See the discussion in B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 80-81, 85-86.
307 Id. at 118-19.
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other states,"308 and would apply Maine law under the "rule of valid-
ity." Professor Cavers agrees, stating that protective policies should only
be applied when the contract involved a resident of the state with the
protective policy and was entered into in that state, or if not, its being
entered into in another state "was due to facts that were fortuitous or
had been manipulated to evade the protective law."30 9
With Milliken may be contrasted the much more recent case of
Lillienthal v. Kaufman,3 10 in which an Oregon borrower secured a loan
in California from a California lender. When the borrower defaulted
the lender discovered that two years prior to the transaction the bor-
rower had been declared a spendthrift in Oregon and placed under
guardianship. Under Oregon law the guardian could avoid the contracts
of the spendthrift other than those for necessaries, and the guardian re-
fused to pay the note. The borrower then brought suit in Oregon and
was met with the defense of spendthrift immunity, which the Oregon
court had earlier sustained in a purely domestic case involving the same
defendant.3 1' In Lillienthal the defense was extended to the foreign case
as well.
The Court held that California law governed the contract as the
state of the most significant relationship and the state of the validat-
ing law. It went on to hold, however, that to apply California law
would be against Oregon's public policy, and that the public policy of
the forum "was so strong that the law of the forum must prevail although
another jurisdiction, with different laws, had more and closer con-
tacts with the transaction." 312 It explicitly applied Professor Currie's
governmental interest approach in justifying the result. It saw Califor-
nia's interest as seeing that its creditor be paid and upholding its repu-
tation as a state where contracts could be made with certain knowledge
that they would be enforced. Oregon's interest was in protecting the
spendthrift and his family, and the Oregon legislature had determined
that the policy of protecting the spendthrifts was more important than
the policy of enforcing contracts. While Oregon also had an interest
in encouraging residents of other states to conduct business with Ore-
gon residents, this interest, in the words of the court, "was deflated by
308 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 477.
309 D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 181. See also Weintraub, supra note 305, at 403-05.
310 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
311 Olshen v. Kaufman, 235 Ore. 423, 385 P.2d 161 (1963).
312 Under the traditional approach the public policy exception was limited to
the refusal to entertain a claim created in another state. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 612 (1934). It did not justify the application of the forum's law to the transac-
tion, and the dismissal on public policy grounds would not be res judicata.
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the recollection that the Oregon Legislature has determined, despite
the weight of these considerations, that a spendthrift's contracts are
voidable."3 13 In other words, the policy to be implemented by the
spendthrift statute was no different in the foreign case than the domestic
one, and the court would recognize the legislative determination in
both cases. Functionally, this is the same situation as Milliken, and the
Oregon court came up with the opposite solution.
What is more significant to me, however, is that despite the talk
about what law governed a contract and public policy, the court ex-
plicitly recognized that the policies behind the Oregon rule were dis-
tinctly anti-contractual policies, policies relating to the protection of a
person and his family, which, for want of a better term, we may call
family law policies. To put it another way, let me try to analyze the
decision in terms of the approach I have suggested. The court recog-
nized that the issue on which there was a conflict of laws-whether a
spendthrift could avoid his contracts-presented a family law problem.
This being so, it looked to the family domicile as the state of primary
reference, and this state was the forum, which recognized the defense.
It then considered the interest of the "contract" state and saw that its
own family law policies conflicted with that state's contract policies.
Since its own policies were strong ones, established by the legislature,
it refused to subordinate its own interest. The court could also have
observed that the number of cases in which the defense would be avail-
able would be few in number, and that realistically its decision to allow
the defense in the foreign case would not inhibit interstate transactions.
Californians will not refuse to deal with Oregonians because of the pos-
sibility that in a rare case an Oregonian will be able to assert the defense
of spendthrift status. While the expectations of the California creditor
will be defeated, his surprise is probably no greater than that of the
disappointed Oregon creditor. Thus it is sound for Oregon to prefer
its family law policy over the contract policy of California.
3 14
In terms of our approach, however, it would have been equally
defensible if the Oregon court in Lillienthal had gone the way of the
313 The court also observed:
We have, then, two jurisdictions, each with several close connections with the
transaction, and each with a substantial interest, which will be served or
thwarted, depending upon which law is applied. The interests of neither juris-
diction are clearly more important than those of the other. We are of the
opinion that in such a case the public policy of Oregon should prevail and
the law of Oregon should be applied . . ..
239 Ore. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
314 If suit had been brought in California, it would be expected that California
would prefer its contract policy to the family law policy of Oregon.
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Massachusetts court in Milliken. The Oregon court could have properly
taken the position that it would be fundamentally unfair to expose out-
of-staters dealing in their home state to the same risks imposed upon
Oregon creditors dealing in Oregon, and that the legislature would not
have intended that the statute be applied here.315 It could also have
adopted a more moderate and restrained interpretation of Oregon's
policy and interest in order to avoid the conflict. But it did not do so
and chose to implement its own policy. The important consideration, in
my view, is that a court recognize that it is not dealing with a defense
based on contract policies, but one involving policies of an entirely
different nature. The fact that suit is brought to recover on a contract
does not mean that the court should approach every issue in the case
with a "contract set." The court in Lillienthal, if it did have a set, had
one of family-protection rather than one of contract-security of trans-
actions. It precisely identified the policies and interests of the concerned
states and made the value judgment to implement its own policies and
interests in the circumstances.
The importance of identification of the problem area here and its
relationship to judicial method will become more apparent in the fol-
lowing examples, which we will assume also come before the Oregon
court. Suppose a California borrower entered into a contract in Oregon
with an Oregon lender in the same circumstances as in Lillienthal. Let
us also assume that spendthrift status exists in California and that the
borrower has been declared a spendthrift there. Under California law,
however, the spendthrift's guardian may not avoid his contracts. The
borrower defaults and is sued in Oregon, either by way of personal ser-
vice or under a "long arm" statute applicable to non-residents who have
entered into contracts in Oregon. He asserts the defense of spendthrift
immunity. When the Oregon court identifies the problem area as one
of family law rather than contract, because the policies behind the Ore-
gon rule relate to protection of the family and are inconsistent with its
contractual policies, it will look to California as the state of primary
reference. California, being the state of the borrower's domicile, where
the social effects of his spendthrift status will be felt, is the only state
interested in extending this kind of family law protection. Since
California does not do so, and since Oregon has no interest in protect-
ing the family of a California defendant to whom California does not
extend protection, the defense should not be recognized.
This result is in no sense discriminatory. While Oregon protects
an Oregon borrower in a suit against him by a California creditor and
315 See D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 191-92; Weintraub, supra note 305, at 419-21.
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does not protect a California borrower in a suit against him by an Ore-
gon creditor, this is because California, his home state, does not extend
this protection to him. Both California and Oregon have a general
policy of enforcing contractual obligations. Oregon makes an exception
in the case of spendthrifts, because in this situation it believes that
family protection policies outweigh contractual ones. Its interest in
applying that policy is limited to its own spendthrifts. If the borrower
were from another state that recognized spendthrift immunity, he
would be able to assert that defense in Oregon. He cannot complain if
he is given the same protection-or lack of it-given by the law of his
home state.316
In our next case an Oregon businessman enters into an oral con-
tract with a California businessman in California, to be performed in
that state. When the Oregon businessman breaches, suit is brought
against him in Oregon. The contract is unenforceable under the Ore-
gon statute of frauds; it is valid under California law. Assuming that
the Oregon court does not treat the statute of frauds question as one
of "procedure ' '317 it should refuse to allow the defense. The policies be-
hind the statute of frauds are obviously contractual in nature; i.e. con-
tracts should not be enforced unless the parties show that they are suffi-
ciently serious about the transaction to put it in writing or make a
memorandum. Having identified the problem area in this way the
court will look to the state the law of which should be applied to deter-
mine rights under the contract, and under any approach, this is clearly
California. Although in terms of interest analysis the case may appear
to present a conflict of interest (Oregon is interested in protecting its
resident defendant; California is interested in protecting its resident
plaintiff), Oregon, having identified the problem area as one of con-
tract, will apply the law of the contract state since there are no coun-
tervailing non-contractual policies that would justify the application of
316 Admittedly, he is being denied the protection of Oregon law and the benefits
that Oregon extends to its own citizens. The discrimination, however, is not unreason-
able, because (1) his home state does not extend him that protection, and (2) Oregon has
an interest in applying its general contractual policy to deny the defense. Therefore, the
refusal to apply Oregon law raises no constitutional questions under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV,
§ 2. See the discussion in B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 503. Suppose, however, that a resident
of a guest statute state is injured by a resident of a state that does not have a guest
statute, and suit is brought in the state of the defendant's residence. Although the plain-
tiff's home state does not protect him, no interest of the defendant's home state would
be served by denying recovery, since its general tort policy allows recovery. To deny
recovery in such a case would thus be discriminatory, and possibly unconstitutional. See
the discussion in id. at 487-90.
317 See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 172, at 851-55.
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its own law.3 18 To put it another way, the court in Lillienthal would
not have found it to be against its public policy to enforce a Califor-
nia contract that did not satisfy the Oregon statute of frauds.3 18 It did
find it against its public policy to enforce a California contract against
an Oregon spendthrift in view of Oregon's strong family law policy,
reflected in the statute enacted for the protection of spendthrifts.
Our third case is the most significant from the standpoint of the
precedential effect of decisions in conflicts cases. In Oregon a married
woman from State X contracts with an Oregonian to stand surety for
the debt of her husband. All factual contacts are in Oregon, and this is
clearly an Oregon contract. Under Oregon law the contract is fully
valid, but under the law of State X a married woman may not be held
as surety for the debt of her husband. Suit is brought in Oregon, either
by obtaining personal service or under the non-resident contracting
act, and the married woman asserts the defense of incapacity. In terms
of interest analysis this is a true conflict-the protective policy of State
X conflicts with the contractual policy of Oregon-and in such a case
it has been said that the forum is justified in applying its own law. In
Lillienthal, however, the Oregon court held that it would prefer the
protective policy reflected in Oregon law over the contractual policy of
the contract state. Explaining the decision in terms of the approach
suggested, it identified the problem area as one of family law, looked
to the defendant's residence as the state of primary reference and
applied its law to allow the defense. Having identified the problem
area in that way, and having held that the family law policy was to be
preferred over the contractual one in that case, its decision serves as a
precedent in another case involving a conflict between family law and
contractual policies. Since it gave effect to the protective policy of the
state of defendant's residence in that case must it not-or at least
should it not-give the same effect to the protective policy of the defen-
dant's state in this one? The question is not whether capacity is to be
determined by the law of defendant's residence or by the law gov-
erning the contract, but whether the Oregon court has chosen to deal
with the problem by preferring the protective policy of the state of
318 This principle is demonstrated in every case where the forum applies the law
of another state to enforce a contract against its resident that is invalid under its own
laws. A good example is when the forum enforces against its borrower a contract that is
usurious under its own law, but not under the law of lender's state. See, e.g., Whitman
v. Green, 289 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1961); Dairy Equip. Co. v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301, 442
P.2d 437 (1968).
319 See Lams v. F.H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651 (Super. Ct. 1935); Jackson
v. Jackson, 122 Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953).
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residence or the contractual policy of the contract state. If Oregon pre-
fers the protective policy of the state of residence when that state is
Oregon, it should also uphold the protective policy when the situation
is reversed and Oregon's contractual policy is required to yield. Per-
haps the task of the court is not only to identify the problem area that
an issue presents in a given case, but to identify the problem area that
such an issue presents in all cases. Consistency of judicial decision and
proper recognition of the interests of other states in a federal system,
it is submitted, require no less.
The variations of the contract-immunity problem are the same as
those discussed previously with respect to tort-immunity. The forum,
having a protective policy that it chooses to implement, as in Lillien-
thal, will apply that policy whenever its resident is a defendant, irrespec-
tive of where the plaintiff resides or where the contract is localized.
When the defendant is a resident of a state that does not provide im-
munity, the defense should not be recognized because the only state
interested in immunizing him does not do So. 3 2 0 When a resident of an
immunity state contracts with a resident of a nonimmunity state in the
latter's state, the result in either state should depend on how that state
has chosen to treat the problem generally. By that I mean that if it has
chosen to prefer the protective policy of the state of residence over the
contractual policy of the contract state with respect to one immunity, as
was done in Lillienthal, it should do so whenever the defendant resides
in an immunity state, even if a different immunity is involved. So too,
if it has chosen to prefer the contractual policy to the protective one
when it was the contract state, it should also do so when its own pro-
tective policy is in issue. When two residents of an immunity state con-
tract in a nonimmunity state, that state will have to decide whether
its contractual policy is sufficiently strong that it should uphold it over
the immunity policy of the parties' home state. This is functionally the
same situation as when two residents of a guest statute state, for exam-
ple, are involved in an automobile accident in a nonguest statute
state.321 In all of these cases the court must avoid the "contract set"
and recognize the anticontractual policies behind the granting of im-
munity. Its decision should represent a value judgment on whether the
protective or the contractual policies are to be preferred, and it should
320 When the defense is a contractual one, however, it will be applied in favor of
a nonresident defendant notwithstanding that the defense does not exist under the law
of his home state. See, e.g., E.C. Warner Co. v. W. B. Foshay Co., 57 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.
1932).
321 And, as in that situation, the parties' home state would be expected to apply its
law and allow the defense.
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follow that judgment no matter whether the protective or contractual
policies are its own or that of another state.
A closely related situation involving the conflict between contrac-
tual and other policies as reflected in the matter of identification of the
problem area is that presented in the case of Haag v. Barnes.322 In that
case the mother of a bastard child brought a suit for support against
the child's admitted father in New York. Apparently the mother had
at all times been domiciled in New York, although she had temporarily
resided in other places. The father at all times was a resident of Illinois.
The child was born in Chicago, but would be considered a New York
domiciliary323 and at the time of the suit resided in New York with the
mother. After the child's birth the mother and father negotiated an
agreement in Chicago pursuant to which the father agreed to pay $275
per month for the support of the child until he reached the age of
sixteen. He was to be released from all further obligations, and the
parties agreed that the contract should be governed by Illinois law.
Under Illinois law the agreement was valid and barred a subsequent
action for support. Under New York law such an agreement was bind-
ing only if at the time it was entered into "the court shall have deter-
mined that adequate provision has been made. '324 The New York
Court of Appeals held that Illinois law applied and affirmed the dis-
missal of the suit.
The desire of the court to dismiss the suit is understandable, since
the father in fact had provided support far in excess of the agreement,
and the mother was obviously trying to extort additional money.3 2 5 But
it seemed to think that it had to apply Illinois law in order to do so, 326
and it justified the application of Illinois law as the law expressly chosen
by the parties and as the law of the state having the most significant
relationship with the transaction and the parties 27 In other words, the
court treated the case as one of contract and applied the modern rule
for choice of law in contract cases.32s
322 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
323 This is so because his domicile follows that of the mother. See RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) § 14(2).
324 9 N.Y.2d at 558-59, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
325 The court stressed this fact in its opinion. Id. at 558, 175 N.E.2d at 443,
216 N.Y.S.2d at 67. See also B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 729; Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard"
in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 498, 499 (1962).
326 It could have applied New York law holding the absence of such approval
as a "technical defect curable nunc pro tunc by a finding of adequacy in the pending
proceeding." B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 729.
327 9 N.Y.2d at 559, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
328 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 187-88.
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While it is true that the parties entered into an agreement
respecting support, for the court to treat the problem area involved
here as one of contract is shocking and indeed contrary to the very
postulates on which the New York law was based; namely that parties
cannot enter into their own contractual arrangements for the support
of a child without court approval. The case did not involve the sale of
commodities, but the maintenance of a child's well-being. Certainly
the relevant policies to be considered-and any set with which the
court should approach the question-are not contractual ones. From
any standpoint, the court was dealing with a problem of family relation-
ships, and the state seemingly interested in applying its law to the rela-
tionship in question, the state of primary reference under our ap-
proach, would be the state of the child's domicile, which here was New
York. New York's interest in applying its protective policy for the bene-
fit of a New York child was very strong, and the most that could be said
was that New York's policy of protecting the child conflicted with Illi-
nois' policy of enabling the father to limit his support obligation by
agreement. Certainly in a case such as this it would be expected that
New York would apply its own law to implement that policy.329 Illinois
should also recognize this as a family law problem and look to New York
as the state of primary reference. The question for it would be whether
its policy-which is also properly denominated as a family policy-
of protecting the father was sufficently strong to require its application
here. It too might, "by a more moderate and restrained interpretation
of its policy and interest," decide to defer to New York.330
The point is that the court is not dealing with a contract prob-
lem. The relevant policies and responses are not those associated with
that area of law we call contract. This was not a commercial trans-
action.331 Mr. Barnes did not enter into his ledger: "Affair with Dorothy
Hagg-so much for flowers, so much for theatre tickets, so much for the
little bastard!" The problem involved the protection of children, and
the analysis of policies and interests must be approached from that
perspective.
The same approach and identification of the problem area should
329 B. CuRIE, supra note 3, at 735-36 (forum's interest in effectuation of its policy);
Ehrenzweig, supra note 325, at 502-03 (law of the forum).
330 Professor Currie also contends that New York should apply its own law if the
mother and child were not New York residents at the time of birth, but were at the
time of suit. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 736-39.
331 For a discussion of "How 'Commercial' Is the Contract" see Weintraub, supra
note 305, at 426-29. Professor Weintraub contends that in the case of the less com-
mercial contract, the need for validation-his basic approach-is not as great.
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be followed whenever the court is dealing with a family arrangement,
notwithstanding that it is embodied in a "contract." Courts do not
always recognize this. For example, the leading case applying the
modern rules' approach of the Restatement Second to contractual trans-
actions is Auten v. Auten 3 32 decided by the New York Court of Appeals
in 1954. There an English husband had left his wife and come to the
United States. She caught up with him in New York, where they
entered into a separation agreement pursuant to which the wife was
to return to England and the husband was to pay a monthly sum for
her support and that of the children. The wife subsequently attempted
to institute a divorce action in England, but no divorce decree was ever
granted. When the husband was long in arrears the wife brought suit
against him in New York to recover the sums due under the agreement.
The lower court found that under New York law the filing for divorce
would constitute a repudiation of the agreement, and applying New
York law, granted summary judgment in favor of the husband. The
wife had contended that under English law the filing for divorce would
not have this effect. The Court of Appeals held that English law should
apply as the state of the most significant relationship. It observed that
the only contact that New York had with the transaction was that the
contract was executed there-because this was the only place where the
wife could find the husband. Since all the other relevant factors were
connected with England the court localized the contract there and
held that English law should apply.
But in Auten, as in Haag, the court was not dealing with a com-
mercial transaction. The case involved the question of whether parties
could regulate marital obligations by agreement and the effect of a
divorce action on such an agreement. To sustain the husband's defense
would mean that the English wife and children would be deprived of
support. Obviously this is a family problem, and since the parties
were all English domiciliaries at the time of the contract, and the wife
and children still were, England would seem to be the only state in-
terested in resolving that problem. The application of English law here
was not inconsistent with any contractual policy of New York for the
simple reason that the case did not involve the kind of transaction in
which contractual policies would be relevant. By identifying the prob-
lem area as one of family law the court would undoubtedly apply the
law of the only interested state, the family domicile.
The "contract-something" identification is also involved whenever
spouses from a community property state enter into a commercial trans-
332 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
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action connected with another state, and the other contracting party
seeks to subject community property to the obligation. Irrespective of
whether the contract is localized in the parties' home state or not,
if under the law of the home state community property is subject to
the obligation, that should be the end of the matter. If the marital
domicile subjects community property to local obligations, it cannot
discriminate against obligations entered into elsewhere. Identifying the
problem area here as one of community property and looking to the
law of the marital domicile avoids the necessity of engaging in extensive
mental gymnastics to achieve the same result.833
Finally we come to the matter of oral will contracts.3 34 To me this
situation is the clearest example of how identification of the problem
area may be result-determinative, and I believe that an analysis of the
relatively few cases involving the question will demonstrate the proposi-
tion as effectively as can be done. The leading-and most recent-is
Bernkrant v. Fowler,335 a "Traynor opinion" case336 decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1961. The plaintiffs were Nevada residents
who owned an apartment building there, subject to a purchase money
mortgage in the amount of $24,000. The seller, who was a California
resident at the time of his death, and for purposes of the point in issue,
was assumed to have been one at the time of the agreement, desired to
refinance the transaction. He orally stated that he would "make a
333 As was done by the Washington Supreme Court in Baffin Land Corp. v. Monti-
cello Motor Inn, 70 Wash.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967) and Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v.
Goble, 70 Wash. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967). In both cases the issue was whether com-
munity property was subject to the obligation. In Baffin the court found that Washington
was the state of the most significant relationship and applied Washington law on that
basis. In Goble the court found that the contract was localized in Oregon, but that
the result would be the same under either law. As Professor Weintraub has observed,
the problem before the court was functionally a false one, and "only a magician could
manufacture a conflict and resolve it against the creditor." Weintraub, supra note 305,
at 416-17. In Potlatch Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, - Wash. 2d -, 459 P.2d 32 (1969),
the court applied Washington law in holding that the community was not liable on a
transaction entered into by the husband in Idaho. Under Idaho law the community was
liable even though the contract was not for the benefit of the community. Washington
law was to the contrary. The court recognized that a true conflict was presented and
applied Washington law on the grounds that (1) Washington had a strong interest in
protecting its community and (2) the Idaho creditor knew that he was dealing with Wash-
ington residents.
334 See generally Cavers, Oral Contracts to Provide by Will and the Choice-of-Law
Process: Some Notes on Bernkrant, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAw-ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKE-
MAN Scorr 38 (R. Pound, E. Griswold & A. Sutherland eds. 1964). The approach advocated
by Professor Cavers is somewhat different from that suggested in the present writing.
335 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
336 For a discussion of the contribution of this distinguished judge to the develop.
merit of the conflict of laws see B. Cusma, supra note 3, at ch. 13.
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sporting proposition and provide in his will that any debt at the time
of his death would be forgiven and cancelled in exchange for a partial
payment and refinancing of the debt."33 7 The requested financing was
carried out, which reduced the debt by some $13,000; the refinancing
cost the plaintiffs about $800 out of pocket. A year and a half later the
seller died, and his will neither forgave the debt nor directed cancella-
tion of the notes. The plaintiffs then brought suit in California, seek-
ing cancellation of the obligation and a reconveyance of the property
under mortgage.
The oral contract to will was found to be enforceable under the
Nevada statute of frauds. The California statute, however, provided
that: "An agreement . . to make any provision for any person by will
is invalid unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his agent."33 18
The court assumed that the transaction came within the California
statute, 9 so that if it were applicable the plaintiffs would be barred.
But it found that the statute was inapplicable and allowed the action
to proceed.3 40 Although, as it observed, California's interest in pro-
tecting estates being probated there from false claims was constitution-
ally sufficient to justify the application of California law, nevertheless:
The contract was made in Nevada and performed by plaintiffs
there, and it involved the refinancing of obligations arising from
the sale of Nevada land and secured by interests therein. Nevada
has a substantial interest in the contract and in protecting the
rights of its residents who are parties thereto, and its policy is that
the contract is valid and enforcable. California's policy is also to
enforce lawful contracts. That policy, however, must be sub-
ordinated in the case of any contract that does not meet the require-
ments of the applicable statute of frauds. In determining whether
the contract herein is subject to the California statute of frauds,
337 This quotation is from the opinion of the district court of appeals. Bernkrant
v. Fowler, 8 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960). rev'd, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d
906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
83 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624(6) (West 1954).
339 As does Professor Cavers. Cavers, supra note 334, at 42. It is that assumption
that I would question.
340 If the decedent had not been domiciled in California at the time of the trans-
action, Nevada law would clearly apply, since "protection of rights growing out of
valid contracts precludes interpreting the general language of the statute of frauds to
destroy such rights whether the possible applicability of the statute arises from the
movement of one or more of the parties across state lines or subsequent enactment of the
statute." 55 Cal. 2d at 595, 360 P.2d at 909-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70. The lower court
had made no finding where the decedent was domiciled at the time of the transac-
tion, so the court proceeded on the assumption that he was domiciled in California and
concluded that the result would be the same.
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we must consider both the policy to protect the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties and the policy of the statute of frauds ...
Since California however, would have no interest in applying its
own statute of frauds unless Granrud [the decedent] remained
here until his death, plaintiffs were not bound to know that
California's statute might ultimately be invoked against them.
Unless they could rely on their own law, they would have to look
to the laws of all of the jurisdictions to which Granrud might move
regardless of where he was domiciled when the contract was
made.... Since there is thus no conflict between the law of Califor-
nia and the law of Nevada, we can give effect to the common policy
of both states to enforce lawful contracts and sustain Nevada's
interest in protecting its residents and their reasonable expecta-
tions growing out of a transaction substantially related to that state
without subordinating any legitimate interest of this state. 41
Professor Currie hailed the decision in Bernkrant as an example of
a "more moderate and restrained interpretation of the forum's policy
and interest," and proving that "the method of governmental interest
analysis need not necessarily produce egocentric or provincial re-
sults. '342 Professor Cavers approves of the result on the ground that:
"Where an oral testamentary contract would be invalid by the law of
the testator's domicile at either the time of the transaction or at death,
yet is valid by the law to which the parties' expectations clearly relate,
the policy shared by both states of protecting such expectations should
prevail. 3 43 It has not been questioned that Bernkrant reached a sound
result, a conclusion with which I shall agree, but for a very different
reason.
Contrasted with Bernkrant may be the older case of Emery v. Bur-
bank, decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1895.344 The
decedent, a Massachusetts resident, made an oral agreement in Maine
with the plaintiff, a Maine resident, to the effect that if the plaintiff
would come to Massachusetts and take care of the decedent, the de-
cedent would leave all of her property to the plaintiff when she died.
This she failed to do, and the plaintiff brought suit in Massachusetts
to enforce the contract. Oral contracts to will were valid in Maine, but
341 Id. at 595-96, 360 P.2d at 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
342 B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 688-89 & n.236.
343 Cavers, supra note 334, at 62.
344 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895). In Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288,
113 N.E.2d 424 (1953), the parties were all New Yorkers, and the only contact with an-
other state was that the actual contract was made in Florida while the parties were
vacationing there. The court applied New York law to invalidate the contract. Although
some of the language in the opinion supports the thesis we are advocating, the factual
context of the case renders it less significant than Emery for our purposes.
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were proscribed by the Massachusetts statute of frauds. The Massachu-
setts court held that its statute of frauds was applicable and dismissed
the suit. Although characterizing the question as one of "procedure"
and invoking the rule that "matters of procedure are determined by the
law of the forum," the court, speaking through Justice Holmes, also
talked in terms of policy:
But the statute evidently embodies a fundamental policy. The
ground, of course, is the prevention of fraud and perjury, which
are deemed likely to be practiced without this safeguard. The
nature of the contract is such that it naturally would be performed
or sued upon at the domicile of the promiser. 45 If the policy of
Massachusetts makes void an oral contract of this sort made within
the state, the same policy forbids that Massachusetts testators
should be sued here upon such contract without written evidence,
wherever it is made.
If we are right in our understanding of the policy established
by the legislature, it is our duty to carry it out so far as we can do
so without coming into conflict with paramount principles. 46
Are Justice Traynor and Justice Holmes talking about the same statute
of frauds? It would seem not from the language in the opinions that we
have quoted. Professor Cavers would justify the result in Emery on the
ground that the transaction was so divided between the states concerned
that there is little basis for a finding that the parties could have reason-
ably expected that the law of the state holding the contract valid would
be the one to be applied and that, therefore, the testator's domicile at
the time of contracting should be viewed as constituting the most sig-
nificant contract. He would, however, also justify the court's reaching a
contrary result if it found that the parties had expected that Maine
law would be applied. 47
It is my submission that the results in Bernkrant and Emery are both
clearly correct. To illustrate this, however, and to bring into focus the
point I really want to make, let me vary the situation in Emery to re-
move any factual connection with the decedent's state except the fact
that he was domiciled there. Suppose that the decedent, a rich Cali-
fornia widow, had a summer home in Nevada where she spent approxi-
mately four months each year. In Nevada she orally agreed with the
plaintiff, a Nevada resident, who had never been to California and
never wanted to go there, that if the plaintiff would keep house for her
during her summer visits, she would leave the plaintiff 50%/ of her
345 This would not be true today, of course, since suit could be brought at the
place of contracting under a long arm act.
846 163 Mass. at 328, 39 N.E. at 1027.
347 Cavers, supra note 334, at 72.
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estate by her will. The arrangement continued until the decedent's
death five years later. The decedent did not include the bequest in her
will, and the plaintiff brings suit against the executor in California to
enforce the oral contract to will. The executor asserts the statute of
frauds, as in Bernkrant. It is submitted that in such a case the California
court, which decided Bernkrant, could well decide to sustain the defense
and that the difference in result would be due to the different identifi-
cation of the problem area in the two cases.
In Bernkrant the court identified the problem area as one of con-
tract and having localized the contract in Nevada, refused to apply the
California statute of frauds.348 The court approached the question with
the "contract set" and talked in terms of the policies associated with
that area of law call contract. It emphasized the need to protect
the legitimate expectations of the parties and to insure security in com-
mercial transactions. It did not give much consideration to the policies
behind the California statute of frauds, which invalidated oral con-
tracts to make a will. May this not have been because the court did not
see the transaction as really involving a contract to will? Or to put it
another way, maybe the court did not view the case as presenting a
decedents' estates problem since the transaction was, in the words of
the decedent, a "sporting proposition." The purpose of a rule prohibit-
ing oral contracts to will, it would seem, would be to prevent the de-
cedent from passing a portion of his estate and disappointing his heirs
except by the execution of a formal document satisfying the require-
ments of a will. But here the decedent was not trying to pass a portion
of his estate by his will. His hope was that he would never have to leave
anything to the plaintiffs because he would have lived long enough for
them to have paid the debt. Perhaps this "promise to will" was within
the letter of the California statute, but this too may be questionable.
In a purely domestic case is it not conceivable that the court-having
to face up to the specific question-might decide that the transaction
did not involve a contract to will within the meaning of the statute,
because the decedent was not really trying to pass a portion of his estate
under the arrangement?
In any event, in Bernkrant the court did not consider the trans-
action to be a contract to will, but an ordinary business arrangement
for the refinancing of a mortgage with the addition of a contingent
provision for forgiving the debt by will if the decedent should "lose his
gamble." Certainly it did not see it as the kind of transaction with
348 The court did not even consider whether the California statute would be applied
on the ground that it was "procedural." See note 314 supra.
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which the legislature was concerned when it enacted the statute of
frauds. Having perceived the transaction as it did, I would submit that
the court in Bernkrant identified the problem area as one of contract,
came up with the associated "contract" responses and looked to the state
where all the events relating to the contract occurred. There was indeed
no conflict between the policies of California and Nevada because in
this case, which did not involve a contract to will, California had no
interest in implementing its decedents' estates policy prohibiting oral
contracts to will.
In the example case, as in Emery, the decedent clearly was attempt-
ing to pass a portion of his estate by the oral agreement and this is the
kind of case with which the legislature was concerned when it enacted
the statute of frauds. The forum's decedents' estates policies are sharply
focused, and the court's set will not be one of contract. The forum's
policy of protecting the estates of decedents against possible false claims
is no less, as the court in Emery pointed out, because the contract was
connected with another state. More importantly, the court is not con-
cerned with implementing contractual policies because it is not dealing
with an ordinary commercial arrangement. It is concerned with im-
plementing the decedents estates policies reflected in its statute of
frauds because it is dealing with an attempt to pass a portion of an
estate by oral agreement. 349 Having identified the problem area in this
way, it would look to the decedent's domicile as the state of primary
reference. Since that state is the forum it can be expected that the
court, as did the court in Emery, would implement its decedents estates
policy by applying its own law. In other words, in Bernkrant the court
treated the transaction as a commercial contract rather than as a con-
tract to will, and under the conflicts principles applicable to commercial
contracts chose Nevada law. In the example, and in Emery, the trans-
action does involve a contract to will, and the decedent's domicile would
want to apply its own law.3 50
Now suppose that Emery or the example case were brought in the
contract state. As a practical matter the issue would be whether the
executor was subject to suit on the ground that the decedent made a
349 In Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y.2d 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953), the court
pointed out that, "It is clear, also, that in reaching our decision here we are not to be
guided by the same considerations as we would in determining the applicability of our
Statute of Frauds to the ordinary or commercial contract." Id. at 300, 113 N.E.2d at 428.
350 See the discussion in Weintraub, supra note 305, at 426-29. Professor Weintraub
concludes that the difference in commercialism between the contracts involved in




contract there. I would suggest that the court might hold that the long
arm" statute was not referring to contracts to will, which, it would point
out, "are ordinarily governed by the law of the decedent's domicile."
Even if it would entertain the suit, I would expect that it would recog-
nize the interest of the domicile in implementing its decedents estates
policies and allow the defense. Since the transaction is not a commercial
contract its "contract" policies would not really be jeopardized by its
so doing. By the same token, if in our example case the laws were re-
versed, and it was Nevada that barred enforcement of oral contracts to
will rather than California, the defense would not be sustained. The
California court, identifying the problem as one of decedents estates,
would first look to the domicile of the decedent as the state of primary
reference and see that it upholds the contract. Nevada, of course, has
no interest in protecting the estate of a California decedent by its statute
of frauds relating to wills,351 and there is no reason to allow the defense.
The results in Bernkrant and Emery (and in our example case)
are fully consistent when the question is approached in the context of
identification of the problem area. The courts were dealing with differ-
ent animals, and in view of the policies to be implemented by a law
invalidating oral contracts to will, it is unsound to attach the same
label to them. The fact that a party to a commercial transaction under-
took the obligation "as a sporting proposition" to make a contingent
provision in his will did not blind the court in Bernkrant to the real
issue before it. It treated the transaction as a commercial contract and
made the conflicts decision with reference to the policies applicable to
that area of law. To me this is the clearest example of how proper and
precise identification of the problem area may produce a sound solution
to many conflicts questions.
C. Property-Something
Under the traditional approach characterization was very impor-
tant in cases involving property rights. But this was often characteriza-
tion of the property itself as "movable" or "immovable" since different
choice of law rules were applicable to each category. Here the issue was
whether the law of the forum or the law of the situs determined the
characterization question.352 Characterization questions would also arise
with respect to the effect of gifts causa mortis: Was this a question of
property so that it would be determined by the law of the situs, or a
351 As it would a Californian entering into a commercial contract in Nevada that
was within Nevada's statute of frauds.
352 See the discussion in A. RoBERTSON, supra note 85, at 190-212.
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question of decedents' estates to be determined by the law of the
decedent's domicile? 53 From the standpoint of policy, however, these
kinds of questions all involved property considerations and do not differ
from other "property" questions such as whether the validity of a char-
itable bequest of land is to be determined by the law of the situs or the
law of the decedent's domicile.354 Therefore, identification of the prob-
lem area will not be helpful in providing a solution to these kinds of
questions under a policy-centered approach.
When identification of the problem area does become important
is when the policies behind a rule seemingly regulating property rights
are not really property policies. In such a case if the court approaches
the conflicts question with the "property set," it will be disposed toward
applying the law of the state apparently interested in regulating prop-
erty rights, which will usually be the situs.3 55 The utility of applying
the law of the situs to all property questions under a policy-centered
approach may itself be questioned,356 but clearly it should not be
applied when the policies behind the rule in question are not prop-
erty policies. Proper identification of the problem area will enable
the court to avoid the "property set" in these cases and the resulting
automatic application of situs law.
Suppose that North Carolina spouses jointly own land situated in
Massachusetts, and one spouse executes a conveyance of the land to the
other. Under Massachusetts law as it existed at that time, husband and
wife could not contract with each other; North Carolina law allowed
such contracts. In Polson v. Stewart, 57 the Massachusetts court held that
the rights of the parties should be determined by North Carolina law
and upheld the conveyance. The same result prevailed in Proctor v.
Frost,35s in which a Massachusetts wife gave a mortgage on her New
Hampshire land as surety for her husband's debt. Under New Hamp-
shire law a wife could not become surety for the debt of her husband,
353 See the discussion id. at 185. The same kind of question would arise with
respect to a Totten trust. See, e.g., Cutts v. Najdrowski, 123 N.J. Eq. 481, 198 A. 885
(E. & A. 1938).
354 See Duckwall v. Lease, 106 Ind. App. 664, 20 N.E.2d 204 (1939); Toledo Soc'y
for Crippled Children v. Hickock, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692 (1953). See generally
Hancock, Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 17 STAN. L. REv.
1095 (1965).
355 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 215-22, 254 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1959).
356 See Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of "Situs" as a Concept in Conflicts
Analysis, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1966).
357 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897).
S58 89 N.H. 304, 197 A. 813 (1938).
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but the New Hampshire court held that the law was not applicable to
an out-of-state wife. In Smith v. IngraM, 359 however, North Carolina
applied its law requiring the "privy examination" of a married woman
making a conveyance of real property to a South Carolina wife who
conveyed land in North Carolina although this was not required by
South Carolina law.
In all of these cases the policies behind the rule of the situs are not
property policies. They are not policies designed to promote efficient
land utilization or to insure security of title. The purpose of the rule is
clearly a family purpose; namely to protect the wife from overreach-
ing on the part of the husband. As in the contract-immunity situa-
tion, the only state interested in extending such protection is the mari-
tal domicile. Only the "property set"-as is definitely demonstrated by
the language of the court in Smith-would cause the situs to apply its
rule to out-of-state parties. Proper identification of the problem area
and an analysis of the precise policies behind the rule of the situs will
avoid this result.3 60
If the laws were reversed and the spouses lacked capacity under
the law of the marital domicile, the situs should recognize that incapac-
ity as between the spouses. Of course, if the rights of a third party were
involved, the situs' property policy of insuring certainty of land
transactions would come into play, and the situs could be expected to
apply its own law to protect the third party.861 What must be remem-
bered is that the policies behind the rule of incapacity are not
property policies and that the only state interested in applying its
protective policy is the state of the marital domicile.
859 130 N.C. 100, 40 S.E. 984 (1902).
360 As the court observed in Proctor v. Frost:
The primary purpose of the statute as thus interpreted was not to regulate the
transfer of New Hampshire real estate but to protect married women in New
Hampshire from the consequences of their efforts, presumably ill-advised, to re-
inforce the credit of embarrassed husbands. Its effect was to create a "protective
incapacity" personal to them. Nothing is said either in statute or decision in
regard to the capacity of married women outside of New Hampshire to make
contracts or conveyances.
89 N.H. at 307, 197 A. at 815. See the discussion in W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASEs OF THE CONFLICr oF LAws 270-76 (1942). In terms of interest analysis the case
presents a false conflict. No policy of the situs would be advanced by the application of
its law and the policy of the marital domicile would be defeated. See the discussion in
D. CAVERS, supra note 21, at 184-85.
361 This is what is done in cases involving improper transfers of community property.
The situs will look to the law of the marital domicile to determine the rights of the
spouses inter se, but will apply its own law to protect third parties dealing there. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959), and
the Comment thereto.
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The other matter of "property-something" identification on which
I want to comment is that of "status-succession." Suppose that a person
domiciled in State A dies intestate, leaving movable property in State
B. His brother, domiciled in State B, had adopted a child there, and
the child seeks to inherit from the decedent. Let us assume that under
State A law adopted children cannot inherit from collaterals; under
State B law they can. If the court identified the problem area as one of
family law, it would look to the "status-creating state," State B. Whereas
if it identifies the problem area as one of succession (which is a part
of the "property" category), it will look to the law governing succession,
State A. Obviously the relevant policies are succession policies relating
to how the estate of the decedent is to be distributed, and this is how
the courts have generally treated the question.3 62 This is not a matter
of distinguishing between the existence of the status and its incidents, 363
but of realizing that the problem is not one of status at all, but of how
a decedent's estate should be distributed.
Likewise recognition of the problem area as one of succession
avoids the question of "what law determines status." Suppose that under
the law governing succession adopted children are entitled to inherit
from collaterals. The decedent's sister, domiciled in another state,
adopted a child there, and that child seeks to inherit from the decedent.
It is not accurate to say in such a case that the law of the adoptive state
determines the status of the child and that the law of the succession
state determines the child's right to succeed. What the court of the
succession state is really doing is interpreting the words "adopted child"
as those words are used in its succession statute. Did the legislature in-
tend that the words "adopted child" be limited to children adopted
there, or did it intend to include children adopted in other states?
Since there would be no rational purpose to be achieved in discriminat-
ing against children adopted elsewhere it is reasonable to assume that
such children are included in the term "adopted child." In the par-
ticular case the claimant obtained that status under the law of another
state, so the court must look to the law of that state to resolve the
factual question--does the claimant have the status of "adopted child"
362 See, e.g., In re Youman's Estate, 218 Minn. 172, 15 N.W.2d 537 (1944); In re
Dreer's Estate, 404 Pa. 368, 173 A.2d (1961); In re Estate of Sendonas, 62 Wash. 2d
129, 381 P.2d 752 (1963).
363 See the discussion in A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 665-66. Professor Ehren-
zweig contends, however, that in a case such as Dreer the adoptee's right to inherit
under the law of the state where the adoption occurred may have been in the contempla-




as that term is used in the forum's succession act? Foreign law is con-
sulted as datum in order to apply the law of the forum.364
The realization that it is succession policies that are involved in
such a situation-as opposed to the distinction between the existence
of status and its incidents-becomes very important when the child
would not have the claimed status under the law applicable to status,
but would under the law governing succession. Again, the court is in-
terpreting the term adopted child or legitimated child as that term
is used in its law and is consulting the law of another state solely as
datum. So, in the situation in which the father attempted to legitimate
the child under the law of his domicile, and his acts were not sufficient
to legitimate the child there but were sufficient under the law of the
forum, the forum, interpreting its own law, should treat the child as
legitimated and entitled to inherita 65 By realistically identifying the
problem area as one of succession the court can avoid the "status-inci-
dent" confusion and can implement the succession policies of the state
the law of which governs the disposition of the decedent's estate.
CONCLUSION
It is my thesis that the courts must assume the responsibility for
the establishment of a body of conflicts law based on precedents and
principles developed in the decisions of particular cases. The question
before a court in a conflicts case should be whether, based on considera-
tions of policy and fairness, the law of the forum should be displaced
in the fact-law pattern presented and the law of another state used as
a model for the rule of decision. In resolving that question I believe it
to be of the utmost importance that the court properly identify the
problem area before it so that it can focus on the precise policies and
interests involved. Likewise, identification of the problem area will
avoid the effect of the "set" that may be produced by the classification
364 See note 160 supra.
865 See In re Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945); In re Estate of Bassi,
234 Cal. App. 2d 529, 44 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Some courts have relied on
the fact that they were interpreting their own law to deny succession rights to a child
who had legitimated or adoptive status under the law of another state, but not under
its own law. See Fuhrhop v. Austin, 385 Ill. 149, 52 N.E2d 267 (1944), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 796 (1944); Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962). The latter
result is questionable since presumably the legislature did not intend to exclude children
enjoying that status under the law of another state. See also In re Bir's Estate, 83 Cal.
App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948), where the court construed the word
"wife" in its succession statute to include two wives the decedent had married in India
while he was domiciled there.
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of a problem situation into areas of law, a process in which every judge
and lawyer engages consciously or unconsciously. Once the judge iden-
tifies the problem area he may be led to the state of primary reference,
the state seemingly interested in having its law applied to resolve that
kind of problem. It is that state's law that he should consider first, and
such consideration may be dispositive of the question, as when the
question is one of immunity and the law of the state of primary refer-
ence does not recognize such immunity. When such consideration is
not dispositive, the policies and interests of other concerned states may
also have to be considered. But the court, by properly identifying the
problem area, will have focused on the precise policies and interests
involved and, in my opinion, is in a better position to arrive at a sound
result.
It is for these reasons that I believe that identification of the prob-
lem area is an integral part of judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws. If I am right, the characterization component of the
traditional approach, as transformed, may provide a useful tool for the
solution of conflicts problems today. To so demonstrate has been the
purpose of this writing.
